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CASTING NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD SUBJECT: 
DEATH PENALTY ABOLITIONISM FOR A 
NEW MILLENNIUM 
Wayne A. Logan* 
WHEN THE ST ATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN CONDITION. By Austin Sarat. Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press. 2001. Pp. xii, 324. Cloth, $29.95. 
For opponents of capital punishment, these would appear promis­
ing times. Not since 1972, when the Supreme Court invalidated the 
death penalty as then administered, has there been such palpable con­
cern over its use,1 reflected in the lowest levels of public opinion sup­
port evidenced in some time.2 This concern is mirrored in the 
American Bar Association's recently recommended moratorium on 
use of the death penalty,3 the consideration of or actual imposition of 
moratoria in several states,4 and even increasing doubts voiced by 
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A. 1983, Wesleyan; 
M.A. 1986, State University of New York at Albany; J.D. 1991, University of Wisconsin. 
- Ed. I thank Professors Susan Bandes, Doug Berman, and David Logan for their helpful 
comments. 
1. See John Harwood, Despite McVeigh Case, Curbs on Executions are Gaining Support, 
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2001, at Al (noting that "paradoxically, the dawn of George W. Bush's 
presidency is bringing a swing in the pendulum away from executions in America"); Patrik 
Jonsson, Governors Soften on Death Penalty, CHRIST. SCI. MON., Oct. 23, 2001, at 2; Ken­
neth Jost, Rethinking the Death Penalty, CONG. Q. RES., Nov. 16, 2001, at 945; Jim Yardley, 
Of All Places: Texas Wavering on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, §4, at 4. 
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, at tbl.2.64 (2001) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK], avail­
able at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t264.pdf (noting that 68% of Americans 
polled in 2001, and 66% in 2000, supported the death penalty, the lowest percentages since 
1981). 
3. AB.A., HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION (Feb. 3, 1997), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/irr/recl 07 .html. 
4. In January 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republican, declared a state-wide 
moratorium on executions, citing concern over the possible execution of factually innocent 
inmates. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty: Illinois First State 
to Impose Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1 .  Prior to Illinois' deci­
sion, legislatures in Nebraska and New Hampshire passed laws providing for temporary 
moratoria, only to be vetoed by their respective governors. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, 
States Follow Illinois Lead on Death Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2000, at A3. Other 
state legislatures have authorized studies of their capital systems. DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2001: YEAR END REPORT 5 (Dec. 2001) ) [hereinafter YEAR 
END REPORT], available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEndReport2001.pdf (vis­
ited Mar. 29, 2002 (discussing studies in Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, 
North Carolina and Virginia); cf Martin Dyckman, Death Penalty Moratorium Has Victory, 
1336 
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high-profile political conservatives.5 An array of troubling empirical 
realities has accompanied this shift: persistent evidence of racial bias 
in the use of the death penalty;6 inadequate capital defense counsel;7 
gross geographic variations in death sentence imposition rates, both 
between and within death penalty jurisdictions; 8 America's solitary 
status among major democratic nations as an endorsee of executions;9 
and, perhaps most influentially, evidence that factually innocent per­
sons have been condemned to death10 and that the capital process it­
self is "broken."11 Concern has also arisen over the execution of par­
ticular death row sub-populations, including the mentally retarded,12 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 3D (noting that over sixty localities have adopted 
moratorium resolutions). 
5. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Right Gets Edgy About Capital Punishment, NEWSDAY, 
June 28, 2000, at A38 (noting opposition among conservative Republican politicians, conser­
vative opinion columnists, and religious leaders); Bruce Fein, Death Penalty Ignominy, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at A16 (conservative columnist deeming lack of adequate capi­
tal counsel "disgraceful"). 
6. See David C. Baldus, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman 
Era, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Jon Sorenson et al., Empirical Studies on Race and 
Death Penalty Sentencing: A Decade After the GAO Report, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 395 (2001). 
7. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and 
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995); Toni Loci, Lawyers, Life, and 
Death: Inept Defenses Taint Many Capital Cases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 19, 2000, 
at 26. 
8. See Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
529, 560 (2000); Nathan Koppel, Selective Execution, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 2001, at 110; Rich­
ard Welling & Gary Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1999, at 
6A. 
9. See Roger Hood, Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 
331 (2001); Dorean M. Koenig, International Reaction to Death Penalty Practices in the 
United States, HUMAN RTS., Summer 2001, at 14. 
10. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Michael L. Radelet et al., 
Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996). In April 2002, an Arizona man became the one.hun­
dredth death row inmate freed since 1973 on the basis of factual innocence. See Kris 
Axtman, U.S. Milestone: JOOth Death-Row Inmate Exonerated, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Apr. 12, 2002, at l .  
11. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995 (June 12, 2000), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_final.pdf (noting inter a/ia that in 68% of death cases 
litigated, there was prejudicial error and that 82% of those defendants retried were subse­
quently given sentences less than death). Professor Liebman and his colleagues have now 
issued a second report, concluding that "[h]eavy and indiscriminate use of the death penalty 
creates a high risk that mistakes will occur." See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN 
SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
brokensystem2/report.pdf. The work is sure to stir controversy for its results and methodol­
ogy, much like its predecessor. See Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Another Recount: 
Appeals in Capital Cases, PROSECUTOR, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 25; Barry Latzer & James N.G. 
Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, 84 JUDICATURE 64 (2000). 
12. See Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: 
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Ment(llly Retarded from the 
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teenagers,13 and inmates who have been "reformed" (e.g., Karla Faye 
Tucker in Texas).14 
It is hard to identify precisely why this reexamination is occurring 
at this point in America's lengthy relationship with capital punish­
ment. Concerns over the unfair application of the death penalty due to 
race15 and socio-economic background,16 and the fallibility of the capi­
tal process, including the execution of the factually innocent,17 have 
been around for decades. So, too, has been skepticism over a core his­
toric justification of the death penalty - its supposed deterrent value 
- what Clarence Darrow long ago aptly dismissed as an "ancient su­
perstition. "1 8 At the same time, public support for the other core his­
toric rationale, retribution, remains strong despite decades of criticism 
and counter-argument, today constituting the most common basis of 
support among death penalty advocates.19 Nor can the increasing skep-
Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911 (2001). This concern took constitutional form as this 
Review was going to press when the Court, by a 6-3 margin, reversed its earlier decision in 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and barred execution of the mentally retarded on 
Eighth Amendment grounds. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). 
13. See Melissa M. Moon et al., Putting Kids to Death: Specifying Public Support for Ju­
venile Capital Punishment, 17 JUST. Q. 663 (2000). 
14. See B. Douglas Robbins, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why Capital Sentences 
Should Be Commuted Upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1115 (2001); Caryle Murphy, "Eye for an Eye" Challenges Faithful, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 2001, at Cl. Ms. Tucker's execution also proved controversial because it fo­
cused attention on the stark paucity of females historically subject to capital punishment. See 
Sam Howe Verhovek, As Woman's Execution Nears, Texas Squirms, N.Y. TIMES, January 1,  
1998, at Al. 
15. See Harold Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 Soc. 
FORCES 369 (1949); Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 271 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF 
POL. & Soc. SCI. 93 (1941); Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discrimina­
tion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. SCI. 119 (1973). 
16. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF 
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 84-91 (1974) (discussi�g inter alia the "warping" effect of poverty). 
17. See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH 
PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994, at 87 (1996) (noting that concern over the 
possibility of miscarriages of justice was expressed by reformers starting in the 1820s); Hugo 
A. Bedau, Murder, Errors of Justice, and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 434-36 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964) (identifying 74 capital 
cases between 1893 and 1962 as "errors of justice"). 
18. CLARENCE DARROW, CLARENCE DARROW ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 104 (Chi­
cago Historical Bookworks 1991) (1924). For an overview of the empirical work casting 
doubt on the deterrent benefit of capital punishment, spanning several decades, see Ruth D. 
Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective Deterrent for Murder? An 
Examination of the Social Science Research, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE 
PENAL SANCTION 157 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). 
19. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 2.66 (reporting that 48% of death penalty sup­
porters polled cited " [a]n eye for an eye/they took a life/fits the crime" as their reason for 
supporting capital punishment; the next most common reason, " [s]av[ing] taxpayers 
money/cost associated with prison," was cited by 20%; and deterrence was a distant third, 
registering 10% support). 
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ticism be attributed to judicial critique, given that the courts, with the 
Supreme Court in the lead, have essentially withdrawn from the death 
penalty debate. The Court, in Justice Blackmun's words, resolved 
some time ago to merely "tinker with the machinery of death,''20 
rather than question the constitutionality of capital punishment in any 
fundamental way. 
While recent public concern over the demonstrated flaws of the 
capital system is a cause for rejoicing among abolitionists, it is appar­
ent that the concern relates more to the "machinery" of death - how 
death decisions are reached - rather than the "machine" itself. In his 
new book, Austin Sarat21 addresses this latter concern, focusing on the 
system's broader effects on American law, culture and politics. In 
When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition, 
Professor Sarat explores "what the death penalty does to us, not just 
what it does for us."22 An unabashed abolitionist and prolific death 
penalty scholar,23 Sarat is respectful of the historic impregnability of 
the traditional retributivist-based justifications of the death penalty.24 
True to his pragmatic orientation, he studiously eschews defense of 
the likes of Timothy McVeigh, whose case he calls the "ultimate 
trump card" of pro-death penalty forces; to Sarat, McVeigh's case is 
both unrepresentative in empirical terms,25 and, in a political sense, a 
dead-end for abolitionists.26 
When the State Kills thus avoids a "frontal assault" on the philo­
sophical and moral justifications of capital punishment; instead, Sarat 
endeavors to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the 
20. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1 145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
21. Professor Sarat is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Po­
litical Science, Amherst College. 
22. P. 14. In adopting such an approach, Sarat echoes the words of Justice Douglas, who, 
addressing another ancient institution, commented: "The true curse of slavery is not [only] 
what it did to the black man, but what it has done to the white man." Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
23. As Sarat notes at the outset, his "writing has been nurtured by political commit­
ment." P. ix. Over the years, Sarat has amply contributed to what Professors Zimring and 
Hawkins have called "advocacy scholarship." See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA, at xvi (1986). 
24. See p. 249 (noting that "it is not surprising that while traditional abolitionist argu­
ments have been raised repeatedly in philosophical commentary, political debate, and legal 
cases, none has ever carried the day in the debate about capital punishment ·in the United 
States"). 
25. This is principally because McVeigh enjoyed adequate defense counsel and his trial 
was the subject of enormous scrutiny and attention. Pp: 11-12. 
26. According to Sarat, from the moment his face appeared in the media after arrest, 
with his "demeanor steely stern . . .  [McVelgh] quickly became the personification of the 
cold-blooded killer, a living, breathing endorsement of capital punishment."· P. 5. McVeigh 
became a "poster boy for capital punishment, the cold-blooded, mass-murderer." P. 11 .  
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many practical ways the death penalty affects the texture and sub­
stance of American life. The book, Sarat suggests at the outset, brings 
a broadened perspective to the study of the death penalty .... It points 
the way toward a new abolitionist politics in which the focus is not on the 
immorality or injustice of the death penalty as a response to killing, but 
is, instead, on the ways that the persistence of capital punishment affects 
our politics, law, and culture. (p. 16) 
Importantly, Sarat is not alone in his highly pragmatic orientation; 
his position is increasingly being voiced by death penalty opponents,27 
which marks an important tactical development in the history of 
American abolitionism. In the following pages, I will sketch the con­
tours of Sarat's "new abolitionism," consider its place in the evolution 
of the death penalty debate, and offer some thoughts on its potential 
consequences and prospects for success. 
I. MAPPING THE CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY 
Like environmentalism, feminism, and other modern social change 
movements, the American anti-death penalty movement owes much 
to the strategic vision of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s. Indeed, although death penalty abolitionist efforts can be 
traced back to the nation's origins,2 8 the cause first took substantial 
root in the post-civil rights era, bearing the unmistakable earmarks of 
the NAACP's orchestrated campaign to dismantle state-sponsored 
segregation. Like the civil rights activists, the abolitionists sought re­
course in the courts in the hope of achieving wholesale constitutional 
invalidation, in lieu of piecemeal and possibly ephemeral legislative 
victories. 
The first inkling of judicial receptivity came in 1963 with Justice 
Goldberg's dissent (accompanied by Justices Brennan and Douglas) 
from a denial of certiorari in two cases contending that the death pen-
27. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH? CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END.OF EXECUTIONS 246 (2000) 
(noting that "many longtime anti-death penalty activists" now eschew arguments based on 
"moral principle"); Louis D. Bilionis, The Unusualness of Capital Punishment, 26 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 601, 601-02 (2000} (noting that recent critiques focus not "on the morality of the 
death penalty as an abstract concept, but instead raise[] sharp questions about the funda­
mental justice of the death penalty as a real, operating social institution"). For a recent, un­
abashed "frontal assault" based on the immorality of executions, see R. George Wright, The 
Death Penalty and the Way We Think Now, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 533 (2000). 
28. See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 50-89 (1989); David Brian 
Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST. 
REV. 23 (1957). The abolitionist cause in America, and elsewhere, owes much to the work of 
eighteenth century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria who advanced among the first rec­
ognized claims against the death penalty. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND 
PUNISHMENTS (David Young trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1986) (1764). 
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alty was disproportionate when imposed for rape.29 Taking the dissent 
as a signal, and mindful that the Court was not yet likely to impose a 
constitutional ban, abolitionist lawyers working under the auspices of 
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund crafted a "morato­
rium strategy," dedicated to attacking the procedures used in capital 
trials. 30 Because "death is different" from other penalties, the lawyers 
argued, capital trials should be characterized by greater procedural 
protections and rights for the accused.31 Invoking this mantra, from 
1963-1972 the campaign achieved a de facto if not de jure cessation of 
capital punishment, as legal challenges to then-common features of 
the capital system created a "logjam" and brought executions to a vir­
tual stop.32 
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,33 by a 5-4 vote the Court invalidated 
capital punishment as then practiced. Although only two justices 
(Brennan and Marshall) categorically condemned use of the death 
penalty,34 the prevailing sentiment of the three other members of the 
Furman majority was that the lack of sentencing guidance in state 
death regimes risked unfair and "capricious" executions in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.35 Furman's upshot was 
sweeping: the death sentences of over 600 individuals were invali­
dated, and the capital laws of some 40 jurisdictions were rendered 
constitutionally suspect.36 
With Furman, abolitionists succeeded in setting the death penalty 
on constitutional terrain, much as civil rights activists had done with 
racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.  The legal victory, 
as in Brown, suggested that the movement's tactical decision to focus 
on judicial relief, as opposed to battling the death penalty on the leg­
islative and public opinion fronts, was wise. Nonetheless, because 
29. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); Snider v. Cunningham, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from de­
nial of certiorari). The Court did not address the proportionality question with regard to 
rape until fourteen years later in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), when it found the 
imposition of death for the rape of an adult woman to be disproportionate. 
30. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 107 (1973). For extended histories of this colorful and often dramatic 
campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND 
OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 440-56 (1994); Eric L. Muller, 
The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 
4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985). 
31. See MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 69-70. 
32. See id. at 106-25. From 1966-1967, for instance, only three inmates were executed. 
See Haines, supra note 17, at 32. 
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
34. See id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 369-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
35. Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); 
id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring). 
36. See MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 292-93. 
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Furman focused only on the methods of capital schemes, not the per 
se constitutionality of capital punishment, abolitionists braced them­
selves for a resurgence of state capital laws. To this end, they endeav­
ored to prepare empirical studies focusing on various aspects of capital 
punishment, providing, if not an ironclad rationale to invalidate the 
death penalty, then supporting bases for judicial rulings favorable to 
the abolitionist cause.37 
When these new capital laws in fact materialized, they assumed 
one of two basic forms: those making death mandatory for certain pre­
scribed offenses and those affording enhanced guidance to sentencers 
combined with heightened procedural requirements. In 1976, the 
Court addressed the respective approaches: in Woodson v. North 
Carolina38 and Roberts v. Louisiana39 the Court invalidated mandatory 
death sentences, and in Gregg v. Georgia,40 the Court upheld a guided 
discretion approach marked by sentencing standards, bifurcated trials, 
and rights to appeal.41 
With Gregg, the Court (by a 7-2 margin) placed its imprimatur on 
capital punishment, locking the abolitionist cause into a twenty-five 
year effort to at least improve, if not abolish, the capital system. Hav­
ing cast their lot with the courts, abolitionists were obliged to live with 
the consequences of the Court's adverse decisions, and there have 
been many through the years.42 
To make matters worse, even apparent judicial victories have often 
ultimately had untoward results for abolitionism. The successful effort 
to have the Court recognize that "death is different" is illustrative. Ini­
tially invoked by Justice Brennan in his Furman concurrence as a basis 
to outlaw capital punishment,43 over time this recognition has actually 
served to shore up faith in the capital system. Starting with Gregg in 
37. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 47. 
38. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). 
39. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
41. Gregg was decided along with two companion cases, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 
(1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), in which the Court upheld similar capital 
regimes. For an overview of the three approaches endorsed by the Court, see WILLIAM J. 
BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 
195-98 (1984 ). 
42. Perhaps the ultimate repudiation of judicial abolitionism came in 1987 in Mccteskey 
v. Kemp, where the Court rejected the most compelling evidence yet available of systemic 
racism in the application of the death penalty, fatalistically conceding that some measure of 
unconstitutional arbitrariness is inevitable. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 308-09 
(1987) (stating that "[t]here is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice . . . . The question is 
'at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable' ") (quoting Turner v. 
Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 36 (1986)). 
43. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, .286-87 (1972) (Brennan, i., concurring) (stat­
ing that "[d]eath is a unique punishment in the United States" because of its "extreme se­
verity . . . finality, and . . .  enormity"). 
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1976,44 the Court has invoked the mantra to justify an increasingly 
complex procedural regime affording the impression of "heightened 
reliability" in the capital process.45 In due course, this impression has 
provided a "false aura of rationality,"46 serving to allay anxiety among 
citizens47 and justice system actors alike.4 8 This constitutional cover, in 
tum, has afforded legislatures latitude to indulge their institutional 
appetite to enact ever harsher capital provisions.49 Even more per­
versely, according to some commentators, the "death is different" sen­
sibility has at times resulted in fewer procedural rights and protections 
afforded to capital defendants, compared to their noncapital peers.50 
In short, with the exception of a precious few categorical victories 
outlawing death for certain offenders,51 or carving out instances when 
death is disproportionate to the crime or the .offender's culpability,52 
44. Gregg, 428 U. S. at 187 ("[D)eath as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevo­
cability . . . .  But . . .  when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say 
that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, 
suitable to the most extreme of crimes."). 
45. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 (1987) (noting "the unique nature of the death 
penalty and the heightened reliability demanded by the Eighth Amendment"). 
46. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 357, 
433 (1995) [hereinafter Sober Second Thoughts]. 
47. See id. at 436 (noting that "the elaborateness of the Court's death penalty jurispru­
dence fuels the public's impression that any death sentences that are imposed and finally 
upheld are the product of a rigorous - indeed, too rigorous - system of constraints"). 
48. See id. at 433 (noting that the procedures have "had the effect of reducing the anxi­
ety that judges and juries feel about exercising their sentencing power"). For empirical dem­
onstrations of this phenomenon, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is It Tilted Toward 
Death?, 79 JUDICATURE 220, 223 (1996); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck? Juror 
Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L. J. 1137, 1138 
(1995); cf Daniel A. Cohen, In Defense of the Gallows, 40 AM. Q. 147, 157 (1988) (recount­
ing story of preacher who in 1800 reminded execution spectators that the condemned "had 
the assistance of most able counsellors and advocates, who . . .  appeared to adduce every 
argument and motive that might possibly operate in [the condemned's) favor") (quoting 
ENOCH HUNTINGTON, SERMON ON THE EXECUTION OF THOMAS STARR (1797) ). 
49. See Douglas A. Berman, Appreciating Apprendi: Developing Sentencing Procedures 
in the Shadow of the Constitution, 37 CRIM. LAW BULL. 627, 652 (2001) (observing that the 
Court's regulatory efforts have "readily allow[ed) legislators to indulge their most punitive 
tendencies in calling for the broadest possible use of the death penalty with no more proce­
dural protections than those constitutionally required"). 
50. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 
2045 (2000) [hereinafter Overproduction]; Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The 
Unconscionability of Sub-minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 
RUTGERS L. REV. 281, 293 (1991). 
51. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (barring execution of the mentally re­
tarded); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (barring execution 
of 15-year-olds); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986) (barring execution of persons 
deemed insane at the time of execution); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976) (invali­
dating mandatory death sentence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976) (same). 
52. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (requiring that for death to be im­
posed in a felony murder case there must be at least "major participation" in the predicate 
felony, "combined with reckless indifference to human life"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 
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judicial abolitionism has been a manifest failure. It _has produced a 
capital system of enormous expense and bewildering complexity, 
which, paradoxically, shares much of the arbitrariness condemned in 
Furman. 53 And, while the campaign has indeed coincided with a de­
crease in the annual number of executions compared to the exorbitant 
rates of pre-Furman times,54 the fact remains that capital punishment 
remains robust in America.55 Tangible proof is found in the numbers: 
at the time of Furman thirty years ago, there were 633 inmates on 
American death rows;56 today, there are 3,701.57 In 1972, before 
782 (1981) (deeming death disproportionate when applied to "getaway driver" in a fatal 
armed robbery); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (deeming death disproportionate to 
conviction for rape of adult female). 
53. See Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capi­
tal-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 862 (1998) ("The Court's experiment with capi­
tal-sentencing regulation counts among its major modern failures. The Court has accom­
plished very little of value, after investing vast judicial resources."); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law, in AMERICA'S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 47, 48 (observing that the capi­
tal system "remains unresponsive to the central animating concerns that inspired the Court 
to embark on its regulatory regime in the first place .. . .  [T]he overall effect . . . has been 
largely to reproduce the pre-Furman world of capital sentencing"). Even conservatives con­
demn the current system. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death 
Penalty, N .Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A21 ("[W]e have constructed a [death penalty] ma­
chine that is extremely expensive, chokes our legal institutions, visits repeated trauma on 
victims' families and ultimately produces nothing like the benefits we would expect from an 
effective system of capital punishment. This is surely the worst of all worlds."). 
54. For instance, in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively, an average of 167 and 129 persons 
were executed annually in the United States. In the 1950s, the average was 72. The 1960s, 
however, witnessed a marked decrease, with an average of 19, followed by virtual cessation 
of executions in the 1970s (a total of 3), and only 12 annual executions averaged in the 1980s. 
In the 1990s the average was 48 executions per year and figures for 2000 and 2001 together 
yield an average of 75. The foregoing figures were calculated on the basis of data contained 
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 11 tbl.1-3 (Hugo Adam 
Bedau ed., 1997); YEAR END REPORT, supra note 4; Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Row 
U.S.A. Winter 2002 [hereinafter Death Row U.S.A.], available at http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/facts.html (visited Mar. 29, 2002) . I am indebted to Professor Doug Berman for this 
insight. 
In the late 1990s there occurred a spike in executions (with a peak of 98 in 1999), after a 
decades-long lull, likely due in significant part to the effects of the Antiterrorism and Effec­
tive Death Penalty Act, enacted by Congress in 1996, which sharply restricts access to fed­
eral habeas corpus and otherwise speeds the processing of capital cases. See Douglas Ber­
man, Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory Reform, 63 OHIO STATE L. J. 
(forthcoming 2002). Changes in state laws in the 1990s, as well, accelerated the review proc­
ess and thus played a role in facilitating the increase in executions. See Overproduction, su­
pra note 50, at 2136-38 (discussing state-level changes). 
55. Perversely, even glaring flaws of the system have been turned by death penalty sup­
porters into public relations assets. See, e.g., Frank Davies, Two-Thirds of Death Sentences 
Derailed, Study Finds, RECORD (BERGEN COUNTY, NJ.), June 12, 2000, at All (quoting 
spokesman for Florida Governor Jeb Bush as saying that "high error rates [in death verdicts] 
show 'an extensive appeals procedure, with adequate due process, works in reviewing 
cases' "). 
56. See MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 292-93. 
57. See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 54. 
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Furman was decided, 50% of Americans supported the death pen­
alty;5 8 today, the level of public support is 68%.59 Finally, at the time of 
Furman, roughly forty U.S. jurisdictions permitted the death penalty;6(} 
the same can be said today.61 The enervated state of the abolitionist 
cause was recently captured by social movements historian Herbert 
Haines: 
Almost a quarter century after its greatest victory in Furman v. Georgia, 
the anti-death penalty movement is often the object of harsh ridicule. Its 
enemies mock it for being out of touch with the American people, who 
are sick and tired of crime, and for whining about unfair treatment of 
lawbreakers. Death penalty opponents are also mocked for having failed 
utterly in their effort to stem the tide of tough justice .... [T]he move­
ment appears to consist solely of dwindling bands of diehards, bewil­
dered by society's waning interest in their case, holding flickering candles 
at execution-night vigils.62 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE AMERICAN 
CONDITION 
It is against this intellectual and historical backdrop that Professor 
Sarat has produced When the State Kills. In the book, Sarat con­
sciously distances himself from those who have sought to address the 
death penalty as a "matter of moral argument and policy debate" 
(p. 14). Also absent from the book is evidence of traditional jurispru­
dential or empirical argument and analysis. True to his longstanding 
"cultural studies" orientation,63 Sarat goes deep, evaluating the perni­
cious ways in which he contends the death penalty has influenced, and 
continues to influence, American politics, law, and culture. The struc­
ture of the book conforms to this strategy: Part I is entitled "State 
Killing and the Politics of Vengeance"; Part II, "State Killing in the 
Legal Process"; and Part III, "The Cultural Life of Capital Punish­
ment." 
58. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 2.64. Indeed, at one point in the pre-Furman era 
(1966), a higher percentage of Americans opposed the death penalty (47%) than supported 
it (42%). /d. In 1994, public opinion in favor of the death penalty peaked at 80%. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 53, at 49. 
61. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 54. 
62. HAINES, supra note 17, at 148. 
63. See, e.g., LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams 
eds., 1998); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, 
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001). 
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A. The Political Effects 
I, 
By "politics" Sarat means something other than the verity that the 
death penalty is a product of the democratic process with high salience 
to elected officials.64 Rather, Sarat invokes the term in a broader 
sense, surveying the corrosive influence of the death penalty on the 
nation's democratic traditions and values. Sarat suggests that capital 
punishment is "incompatible with democratic values": it is tpe "ulti­
mate assertion of righteous indignation, of power pretending to its 
own infallibility" (p. 16). This governmental hubris, in the face of the 
ineradicable finality of execution, Sarat contends, is at odds with the 
"spirit of openness, of reversibility, of revision" he posits as necessary 
to democracy (p. 16). Moreover, Sarat is concerned that individuals, as 
a result of their service on capital juries and their state citizenship, be­
come complicit in state killing; this complicity "contradicts and dimin­
ishes the respect for the worth or dignity of all persons that is the enli­
vening value of democratic politics" (pp. 16� 17). 
Sarat develops his general tenet of the corrosiveness of the death 
penalty by addressing what he calls the "politics of vengeance" (p. 31). 
In Chapter Two, Sarat looks at how the victims' rights movement has 
affected the death penalty process, especially given the advent of vic­
tim impact evidence in capital trials after the Supreme Court's 1991 
decision in Payne v. Tennessee. 65 The chapter's title says it all: "The 
Return of Vengeance: Hearing the. Voice of the Victim in Capital Tri­
als." Sarat observes that Payne, which reversed the Court's decision 
only four years before in Booth v. Maryland barring such evidence,66 
was significant for two reasons. 
First and foremost, the Court's dramatic reversal represented a 
major victory for the victims' rights movement, permitting survivors of 
murder victims to expressly testify to their loss and the valued per­
sonal traits of victims.67 Although the Payne Court rationalized its 
• 64. For elected officials, as Sarat accurately notes, being "on the wrong side of the death 
penalty debate" can have dire professional consequences. P. 18. This influence is felt among 
judges, prosecutors, legislators, and governors alike. See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., KILLING FOR VOTES: THE DANGERS OF POLITICIZING THE DEATH 
PENALTY (1996); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
759 (1995); E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 
79 MARQ. L. REV. 649 (1996). . 
65. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
66. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
67. Payne, 501 U. S. at 819 (permitting consideration of "evidence relating to a particular 
victim or to the harm that a .capital defendant causes a victim's family"). In renouncing 
Booth, the Court also further distanced itself from its "death is different" rationale. In 
Booth, the Court was at pains to emphasize that victim impact evidence was permissible in 
noncapital trials but not capital trials because of the uniquely severe penalty at stake. See 
Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12. Payne obliterated this distinction. 
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about-face in the name of procedural fairness, permitting the state to 
"balance" the personal loss of survivors against the virtually unfet­
tered right of defendants to present mitigating evidence,6 8 the outcome 
owed as much, if not more, to politics. With a conservative majority 
now firmly in control,69 the Payne Court's renunciation of Booth 
evinced a' plain sensitivity to the potent "voice" of the victims' move­
ment.70 As Sarat astutely recognizes, the potency of the movement 
stems both from its basic empathetic appeal and the government's felt 
need to fortify the political legitimacy of its justice system, of late 
harshly criticized for being· insufficiently sensitive to the needs of 
crime victims and their survivors.71 Sarat condudes, however, that this 
effort to shore up the basic weakness of the state in the end only exac­
erbates its frailty, evidencing a governing philosophy motivated by 
"fear and anger" (p: 58). 
Second, Payne has made capital decisions themselves "more per­
sonal, more emotional, and more specific" (p. 43). By permitting the 
personal stories of survivor loss and victim value to permeate· capital 
trials, Sarat observes, the Court allo'wed passion to be "introduced 
into the temple of reason" (p. 43); the Court "brought revenge out of 
the shadows and accorded it an honored place in the jurisprudence of 
capital punishment" (p. 45). Again, this shift, Sarat notes, suggests the 
influence of an enervated governing sensibility in which "all institu­
tions are judged by their responsiveness to private preferences" 
(p. 58), rather than broader public good. While heeding the "voice" of 
victims seems at first blush to have a salutary effect, binding citizens to 
their common prospect of victimhood, Sarat sees it as ultimately a sop 
of transitory value. This is because by erasing the line between private 
vengeance and public retribution, the legal system disserves itself: it 
undercuts the trust in impartially dispensed justice necessary to citi­
zens' faith in democratic governance (pp. 57-58). 
68. Payne, 501 U. S. at 825-26. To the Payne majority, precluding victim impact evidence 
"deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from 
having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first­
degree murder." Id. at 825. For a discussion of the post-Payne use of victim impact evidence, 
and the modest limits imposed on its use by courts and legislatures, see Wayne A. Logan, 
Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in 
Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1999). 
69. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FuTURE OF 
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 444-48 (1999) (noting changes in Court membership be­
tween Booth and Payne, including the retirement of Booth's author, Justice Lewis Powell). 
70. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 ( Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the ban "con­
flict(ed] with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 
'victims' rights' movement."); id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
"has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal"). 
71. For more on the governmental response to the victims' movement, see DOUGLAS E. 
BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1999); PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME 
VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2001); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the 
Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515 (1982). 
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To these observations, one might add, the state's continued em­
brace of the death penalty· can actually impede, not promote, the in­
terests of victims and their survivors in two basic ways. The first turns 
on the very availability of the death penalty, as opposed to some lesser 
sanction. As I have argued elsewhere, "there is no monolithic 'every 
victim' "72 - victims, and their survivors, have different views-on capi­
tal punishment.73 As a result, pro-capital decisions inevitably serve to 
marginalize those who oppose capital punishment.74 Conversely, be­
cause death is actually sought in only a relative. handful of murders, 
and imposed in fewer still,75 the perceived worth of some victims is in­
evitably diminished in the minds of some.76 The variability of capital 
punishment thus significantly enhances the perception - indeed, re­
ality - that life is unevenly valued and justice is inconsistently dis-
pensed.77 
· 
72. See Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims' Anti-Death 
Penalty Views and Prosecutors' Charging Decisions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1999, 
at 41, 48. 
73. See id. at 41-42 (providing recent examples of survivors expressing disagreement 
over capital charges being brought against killers of loved ones); Brooke A. Masters, 
Daughter Seeks Mercy for Father's Killer: Woman Talks to Condemned Man, WASH . POST, 
Mar. 10, 2000, at Bl (same); Sara Rimer, Victims Not of One Voice on Execution of 
McVeigh, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at Al (same). For a discussion of how these varied sen­
timents can influence capital trials, see Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sen­
tence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517 (2000). 
74. An example of this heterogeneity is manifest in the national organization Murder 
Victims' Families of Reconciliation, whose web site reads: 
In our society there is an institutional bias in favor of killing people who kill, and a prescrip­
tive attitude towards survivors of murder victims that we need the execution of killers to re­
cover from the trauma ... . 
[A]s survivors who oppose the death penalty, we are often treated with derision for our 
views, our affections for our loved one are challenged, and we become, in effect, "second 
class" victims. In the eyes of some in law enforcement and some members of the public at 
large, we are individuals not worthy of the same type of attention and support accorded to 
"good" victims, i.e., those family members of murder victims who support the death penalty. 
See Penny Cushing, Murder Victims for Reconciliation, A Welcome from Penny Cushing, 
available at http://www.mvfr.org/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002). 
75. See Overproduction, supra note 50, at 2052, 2065 tbl.4 (noting that "[s]ince Furman, 
an average of about 300 of the approximately 21,000 homicides committed in the United 
States each year have resulted in a death sentence"). 
76. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 23, at 162: 
The victim's mother cries out for the murderer to be executed and is dissatisfied with any 
lesser penalty, precisely because the death penalty is available as the most substantial re­
sponse to willful killing in the United States at this time. Because it is available, any lesser 
penalty would depreciate the significance of the crime and would confer second-class status 
on the life, and the circumstances of the death, of the victim. The frustrated response and the 
outrage are a function of the existence of the death penalty. 
Studies showing that murders involving black victims are less likely to be prosecuted 
capitally further suggest such a devaluation. See, e.g. , Fox Butterfield, Victims' Race Affects 
Decisions on Killers' Sentence, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at AlO. 
77. See Logan, supra note 72, at 43-44 & nn. 27-33 (noting same and citing recent exam­
ples of prosecutors' willingness to defer to the wishes of victims or survivors on death deci-
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The second negative effect relates to the emotional consequences 
of the death penalty on- survivors. As has often been noted, it remains 
unclear whether execution can provide "closure" to survivors.7 8  
Moreover, as Professor Susan Bandes has observed, "different victims 
have different needs, and . . .  an individual victim's needs may change 
over time"'.7 9 - variables that the unequivocal sanction of death often 
cannot accommodate. Professor Bandes quite rightly notes that we 
should 
be careful to distinguish the question of what victims need from the ques­
tion of what the legal system ought to provide. Some of what individual 
victims or survivors need to attain closure must come from psychological, 
religious and social support systems. Such systems have greater ability to 
individuate among victims and to accommodate the shifting and complex 
needs of particular victims. They are not obligated to reach a fixed and 
categorical judgment, or any legal judgment at all. Moreover, they are 
not obligated to weigh a host of other factors against the victim's needs, 
including the rights of the defendant and the good of society as a whole.80 
Along these same lines, the capital process itself can be harmful to 
survivors, forcing them to endure the drawn-out litigation process, 
during which the condemned becomes the focus of attention and the 
merits of his or her case are publicly debated. 81 This public focus on 
the condemned is only heightened at the theoretic moment of most 
satisfaction to survivors, the actual execution, because as Professors 
Zimring and Hawkins explain, the death penalty "chang[ es] the sub­
ject . . .  from crime to punishment." 82 The McVeigh execution exempli-
sions); see also Richard Willing, Prosecutor Often Determines Which Way a Case Will Go, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1999, at 6A (noting that "the single most important step in the proc­
ess comes first, when the local prosecutor decides how to handle the case and whether the 
defendant will face the death penalty"). 
78. See generally Lifton & Mitchell, supra note 27, at 197-212. This question swirled 
around the McVeigh execution: to some survivors "closure" was a misnomer because their 
grief would not end with the execution, while others looked forward to McVeigh's demise 
because at least his visage from prison and callous utterances would be put to an end. See 
Virginia Culver, Decision Surprises Father of Victim, DENVER POST, June 7, 2001, at A20 
(quoting survivor statement that "the only good thing about the execution is that from that 
point on we won't have to look at Tim McVeigh or listen to him"); Jo Thomas, "No Sympa­
thy" for Dead Children, McVeigh Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at A12 (recounting 
McVeigh's view that children killed in the bombing were merely "collateral damage"). 
79. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of 
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1599, 1602-03 (2000). 
80. Id. at 1605-06. 
81. See GARDNER C. HANKS, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: CHRISTIAN AND 
SECULAR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DEA TH PENAL TY 92 (1997) (observing that "[p ]lacing 
a murderer in prison for life generates little chance that he will be the center of society's at­
tention. Victims' families can mourn their loss and move into the future without having to 
attend hearing after hearing in which a sympathetic view of the offender is presented"). For 
an especially gripping account of this extended torment, see William H. Brill, Finality? Not 
for Us, and It's 17 Years Later, WASH. POST , Apr. 29, 2001, at B3. 
82. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 23, at 134. 
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fied this, with the world fixated on the death chamber in Terre Haute, 
lndiana,83 despite the professed desire of the media to focus on the vic­
tims and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing. 84 
In short, contrary to conventional thinking on the subject, the 
needs of victims and their survivors are not necessarily congruent with 
capital punishment, and abolitionists would be wise to emphasize this 
distinction. As Peter Hodgkinson has pointed out, "[t]he trial is not 
the place to consider the very legitimate needs and rights of the fami­
lies and friends of the victim. Rather, there should, in effect, be a sepa­
rate victim justice system." 85 Equally important, abolitionists must 
emphasize that "[v]ictims' needs and rights should not be met at the 
expense of humane, effective, and proportional responses to off enders 
and their needs should not be confused with or influence the treat­
ment of offenders."86 By highlighting these important distinctions, 
abolitionists can both diminish the reflexive positive connection made 
between the death penalty and victims' rights, and align themselves 
with the politically appealing cause of victims,87 without being accused 
of manipulation and pandering, as the government (rightfully) has. 8 8  
83. McVeigh's mastery manifested itself when he tendered his final statement, where he 
defiantly quoted the poem Invictus, which intones that "I am the master of my fate: I am the 
captain of my soul," and in efforts to control his final public image as a martyr by seeking to 
appear wan and emaciated in the gurney as a result of dieting. See The McVeigh Execution: 
McVeigh Dies in Silence; Oklahoma City Bomber Executed Six Years After Killing 168, 
STAR-TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS) , June 12, 2001, at lA (describing McVeigh's final moments); 
Laura Peek, McVeigh Starves Himself to Look Like a Martyr, TIMES (LONDON), June 9, 
2001, at 15 (noting statements by fellow inmates that McVeigh tried "to look like a concen­
tration camp inmate and a .  martyr"). Even after death, McVeigh managed to retain the 
stage, when his attorney Robert Nigh emphasized his personal background, including mili­
tary service. See Tom Beyerlein, McVeigh Saga Ends Quietly; Oklahoma City Bomber 
Leaves Note, But Doesn't Speak, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 12, 2001, at lA. 
84. See Caryn James, The Oklahoma Bomber's . Final Hours Are Hardly Television 
News's Finest, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A26. 
85. Peter Hodgkinson, Europe - A  Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique 
of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 625, 650 (2000). Hodgkinson adds that if 
ab<;>litionism is to prevail it must make 
Id. 
explicit recognition of the needs and rights of victims. What is needed is not a cynical adop­
tion of a victim-friendly strategy but rather the acceptance that homicide victims and those 
that survive them have inherent needs that should be recognized. The failure to do so has 
driven many moderate, perhaps anti-death penalty victims' families, reluctantly, into the 
arms of the pro-lobby who can and do offer succor and 'solutions' to the hurt, anger, and 
frustration experienced by such families. 
86. Id at 651. 
87. See JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND 
NEW VICTIMS 119-41 (1999) (describing powerful empathic appeal of victim imagery and 
evolution of "the victim industry"); Bruce Shapiro, Victims & Vengeance: Why the Victims' 
Rights Amendment is a Bad Idea, NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11 (noting that "[i)n the lan­
guage of American politics today, victims of violent crime are accorded uniquely sanctified 
status"). 
88. As Robert Elias has written: 
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In Chapter Three, Sarat elaborates on the broader effects of the 
political compromises he sees as demanded by· continued resort to the 
death penalty. In "Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the 
Technologies for Taking Life," Sarat chronicles the ongoing efforts by 
government to devise execution methods that are "humane" and 
"painless." Sarat succinctly describes the technological journey from 
the rope and gun to the chair, to the needle, and points in between. 
Grounding his analysis · .in Michel Foucault's work,89 Sarat observes 
that the overall historic trajectory has been to make executions less a 
matter of public drama and more one of "mundane technique" (p. 67). 
This "search for a painless way of killing those who kill," he notes, "is 
somewhat unsettling and paradoxical" (p. 63). Indeed, "[w]hy should 
the state be concerned about the suffering of those it puts to death?" 
(p. 63) . 
The answer Sarat offers is that the state must do so in the name of 
a "legitimization strategy": to engender the idea that it is imposing a 
"painless" death,i which serves to demarcate the state's "civilized" ex­
tinction of life, in contrast to the ''savage" killing perpetrated by the 
condemned.90 In a corollary sense, the state seeks to retain control 
over the iconographic territory "by not allowing those condemned to 
die to assume the status of victims of outmoded technologies of death" 
(p. 82). According to Sarat: "We kill gently not out of concern for the 
condemned but rather to establish vividly a hierarchy between the 
law-abiding and the lawless" (p. 82). To Sarat the evolution toward le­
thal injection has allowed Americans to "kill with a pretense of hu­
manity . . .  [and] believe themselves to be the guardians of a moral or­
der that, in part, bases its claims to superiority on its condemnation of 
killing. "91 
Sarat's incisive analysis overlooks a perhaps more basic motivation 
of "humane" executions, however. To be sure, the brutal imagery of 
recent botched executions (electrocution, in particular) provides a 
Especially in recent years, the political use of victims has helped promote government power ' ·  
and justify our hardline response. Victims could a s  easily represent the state's failure, but by 
coopting victims and the victim movement, the state may use them to portray its apparent 
concern and promote its legitimacy instead. As such, victims may help perform an ideologi­
cal and political function . . . .  
ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 233 (1986). 
89. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1978). 
90. P. 82; see also p. 83 (noting that the state "seeks legitimacy in an image of the hand 
of punishment humanely applied"). 
91. p. 84. In reality, even lethal injection has resulted in decidedly inhumane outcomes. 
See JAMES w. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, at 147 (1994) (recounting an execution where "the reac­
tion to the drugs induced a violent choking, gasping and writhing on the gurney - so much 
so that one witness fainted"). 
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strong incentive for the state to explore ways to kill with less brutality 
and to thus maintain its magisterial stance.92 But in focusing exclu­
sively on the nuanced meanings of the state's motivation, Sarat under­
plays the coercive threat of a traditional Eighth Amendment claim, 
one of the few remaining constitutional bases for challenging the 
death penalty. As recent experience in Florida and elsewhere demon­
strates, Eighth Amendment claims, although perhaps old-fashioned 
and "frontal," remain a formidable catalyst for change.93 Interestingly, 
the ostensibly benign "restraining hand of the law" (p. 84), might itself 
have been subverted to legitimize state killing, providing "cover" for 
what Sarat conceives as an otherwise indefensible state action. One is 
left wishing that Sarat had trained his formidable analytic skills on this 
provocative issue.94 
Beyond this, however, Sarat's analysis is surely on point in its rec­
ognition of the ironic effect of the state's effort to execute in a puta­
tively more humane fashion. The irony lies in the state's effort to si­
multaneously cater to the often vengeful desires of survivors, 
epitomized in Payne, while executing those it condemns in what ap­
pears to be a nonvengeful, painless manner for public relations rea­
sons (p. 69). Since When the State Kills was published, it has indeed 
become apparent that technological "advances" designed to maintain 
the legitimacy of capital regimes95 might actually undercut the appeal 
of executions. Survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing expressed 
profound dissatisfaction over the clinical, expedient nature of 
92. The legerdemain was not lost on one Ohio death row inmate who, provided the 
statutory choice between injection and the state's 104-year-old electric chair, insisted on the 
latter in the hope of graphically illustrating the execution process. Francis X. Clines, Inmate's 
Chosen Means of Execution Starts New Debate: Ohio is Considering Ban on Electric Chair, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A14. According to his lawyer, the inmate felt the execution 
" 'shouldn't be like taking the family pet to the vet's to have him quietly put to sleep.' " Id. 
" 'He wants taxpayers to understand they play a role in executions and the killing can't be 
sanitized.' " Id. 
93. See Deborah W. Denno, Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 665 (2000) 
(noting how Eighth Amendment challenge to Florida's use of electrocution, as to which Su­
preme Court granted certiorari, prompted Florida legislature to adopt lethal injection, and 
that other states are considering disavowing electrocution in response to challenges). In Oc­
tober 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated electrocution on Eighth Amendment 
grounds, after rebuffing several previous challenges. See Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137 
(Ga. 2001). 
94. As Professor Deborah Denno has observed, the effort by states to avoid Eighth 
Amendment challenges "buffers the death penalty itself from scrutiny, or from any possible 
death penalty hiatus that may occur if a method is rendered unconstitutional." Deborah W. 
Denno, Getting to Death: Are Electrocutions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 389 
(1997). 
95. By embracing lethal injection, as journalist Susan Blaustein has noted, the govern­
ment "has turned dying into a still life, thereby enabling the state to kill without anyone in­
volved feeling anything at all." Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution, in THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 54, at 387, 399. Death by needle is thus a "non­
event." Id. "We have perfected the art of institutional killing to the degree that it has dead­
ened our natural, quintessentially human response to death." Id. 
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McVeigh's execution, with some stating that life without parole would 
have exacted a harsher, more condign toll.96 Perhaps more ominous, a 
federal jury in the capital trial of Mohamed al-'Owhali, convicted of 
bombing the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, rejected a death sentence in part 
because the sterile ritual of lethal injection was "very humane and the 
defendant will not suffer."97 If it perhaps goes too far to say that the 
situation "precipitate[ s] a crisis of legitimacy,"9 8 it surely puts death 
penalty jurisdictions in an uncomfortable position. They must satisfy 
the felt governmental need to kill humanely, but still satisfy the 
bloodlust of survivors who feel they have a rightful place at the table 
of justice. A tall order to satisfy; to be sure, yet one of the govern­
ments' own making. 
B. The Legal Effects 
Part II of When The State Kills focuses on how the death penalty 
corrodes legal process and values. In perhaps the most compelling of 
the part's three chapters, "Capital Trials and the Ordinary World of 
State Killing,'' Sarat recounts his experience observing the capital trial 
of William Brooks, an African American prosecuted in Georgia for 
the rape-murder of a white female. His choice of the Brooks trial, as 
opposed to a more high-profile trial such as McVeigh's, is no coinci­
dence; in selecting a run-of-the-mill capital prosecution, Sarat seeks to 
shed light on how "the business of the killing state is done beyond the 
glare of the media attention."99 
Sarat, as has become fashionable,100 regards the capital process in 
dramaturgical terms rich in legal and social significance.101 As Sarat 
96. See Jim Yardley, Execution on TV Brings Little Solace, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at 
A26. 
97. See Benjamin Weiser, Life for Terrorist in Embassy Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2001, at Al. 
98. P. 81. For an argument to similar effect, see Mona Lynch, The Disposal of Inmate 
#85271: Notes on a Routine Execution, in 20 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 3, 25, 
27 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2000) (predicting that "the reshaping of the death 
penalty into a sanitized and routinized disposal process . . . may actually hasten its obsoles­
cence" and that the death penalty's "superfluousness as penal policy and practice will likely 
be revealed"). 
99. P. 88. It bears mention, as Sarat acknowledges, that Brooks's trial is atypical in at 
least one important respect: he benefited from the help of stalwart capital defender Stephen 
Bright, who ultimately managed to avoid a death sentence for Brooks. 
100. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and 
Effective Representation in Capital Cases, 30 ST. MARY'S L. J. 421 (1999). 
101. See pp. 88-89 (noting that "[t]rials of persons accused of capital crimes provide one 
vehicle through which to consider the complex relationship of law and violence that state 
killing necessarily entails . . . .  "). Sarat elaborates: 
The opportunity to talk about violence and to distinguish capital punishment from murder 
occurs in those rare moments - capital trials - when both are spoken about at once. As a 
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portrays it, to the State of Georgia, Brooks's rape and murder of Carol 
Galloway embodied the age-old construct of a murderous black male 
preying on a pure and virtuous white female. By means both subtle 
and overt the prosecutor endeavored to keep the penalty .question on 
this familiar terrain to establish Brooks's "otherness" so as to make it 
easier to cast him from the human circle.102 The government's case was 
thus reduced to an easily digestible, "simple morality tale, a reassuring 
sentimental narrative," which jurors could use to justify the "engine of 
state killing" (p. 93). · 
The defense, for its part, did its best to convince jurors of the de­
fendant's humanity, by means of a similar narrative strategy. Rather 
than trying to excuse Brooks's murderous act, the defense sought to 
contextualize it within his own brutalized personal life, to provide ju­
rors with a reason to exercise mercy, showing the "pain and victimiza­
tion" he himself endured in life prior to the murder (p. 107). In so do­
ing, Sarat recognizes, the defense relied upon "the cultural power of 
the idea of victimization even as it trie[ d] to refigure and complicate 
that idea. "103 
Sarat is surely correct in his assessment that narrative has played, 
and continues to play, a central role in capital trials. The problem, ac­
cording to Sarat, lies in two consequences of its use. The first is that 
narrative tends to unduly "flatten" and "simplify" capital trials and 
create fertile soil for crass "cultural oppositions," which too often -
as in Brooks's trial - play into racist fears and stereotypes (p. 106). 
The second is that the simplifying quality of narrative conduces to the 
construction of overly simplistic, mutually exclusive explanatory sto­
ries by the prosecution and defense, respectively: that the defendant's 
act was one of demonstrable free will or the result of deterministic 
forces beyond his control (p. 116). 
result, such trials, whether celebrated or not, are crucial and unusually revealing moments in 
the life of the Jaw. 
P. 89; cf Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cf. REV. 305, 385 (noting that 
"(t]he criminal trial is a 'miracle play' of government in which we can carry out our inarticu­
late beliefs about crime and criminals within the reassuring formal structure of disinterested 
due process"). 
102. For elaboration on this prosecutorial strategy, see Craig Haney, Violence and the 
Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1451-55 (1997). 
103. P. 107. Sarat also notes that the trial was rounded out by a third narrative, one that 
in fact was nonexistent as a matter of law: descriptions of death house procedures, and the 
physical experience of the condemned at the moment of execution. The information is 
barred on the rationale that it is irrelevant as it constitutes neither mitigating nor aggravating 
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36, 60 (Cal. 1994); Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 
1087, 1104 (Miss. 1997). For an argument that juries should hear such information, see Earl 
Martin, Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of Capital Punishment, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 84, 121-22 (1997). 
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In Chapter Six, Sarat builds upon the role of narrative, focusing on 
its use by appellate counsel for death row inmates. Sarat extols what 
he sees as the virtuous, thankless work of a small cadre of dedicated 
counsel104 and is enthusiastic about the positive role of narrative in the 
abolitionist cause. According to Sarat: 
All lawyers traffic in narrative, but narrative plays a particularly impor­
tant role in the work of lawyers trying to end state killing . . . .  [Death 
penalty lawyers] construct narratives first to humanize their clients and 
second to connect their clients' fates with broader social and political 
concerns. In so doing, they make a powerful political claim even in an era 
when the odds of ending capital punishment are so heavily stacked 
against them. (pp. 181-82): 
Individual stories of the condemned thus provide fodder for the 
broader political effort to end state-sanctioned killing. 105 They serve an 
"archival" role that Sarat sees as critically important to the long-term 
goal of abolitionism: 
Death penalty lawyers use the legal process as an archive, a place to rec­
ord and preserve their deeply held views of justice so that, someday, they 
may be retrieved and so that the killing state someday may be disman­
tled. They turn to the law to carry on a political struggle . . . .  Although 
death penalty lawyers . . .  often cannot save their clients' lives, perhaps 
saving the client's story may be valuable for the political effort to end 
capital punishment.106 
According to Sarat, "[i]n an era when saving the lives of those con­
demned to die is so difficult, saving stories may be all the more valu­
able" (p. 184). 
What Sarat fails to recognize - or at least acknowledge - in Part 
II is that narrative cuts both ways. This blind spot evidences itself not 
just in Sarat's almost exclusive focus on the negative outgrowths of 
only the state's use of narrative at trial. It is also apparent in his une­
quivocal endorsement of narrative by appellate counsel for the con­
demned.107 Why should it not also be accurate to say that narrative 
104. According to Sarat, appellate capital defenders "are the last line of defense in the 
effort to prevent executions. These men and women carry the burden of representing some 
of the most hated persons in American society . . . .  The success of their work is crucial in 
determining when the state kills and how much state killing there will be in the United 
States." P. 160 
105. See p. 177 (noting that "[d]eath penalty lawyering thus requires a concerted effort 
to write an enduring story, a story told to an audience present only in the imagination"); 
p. 177 (noting the "broader political work of putting history into narrative"). 
106. P. 162; see also p. 168 (asserting that "[d]eath penalty lawyers use narrative to buy 
time for their clients, but even when they fail, they seek to preserve their clients' stories"). 
107. This positive portrayal of the defense bar·, frequently criticized as obstructionist 
foot soldiers for abolitionism, contrasts with the public relations astuteness that permeates 
other parts of the book. Disdain for capital defenders, for instance, has been voiced by Jus­
tice Scalia with characteristic flair. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (maligning "[t]he heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punish­
ment" engaged in "a guerilla war" who make capital sentencing a "practical impossibility"). 
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when used by death penalty foes also "flattens" and distorts the death 
decision making process? Does not the use of narrative by the defense 
also contribute to the increasing "personalization" of capi�al trials, so 
eloquently condemned by Sarat earlier in the book?10 8  Inevitably, by 
appealing to pathos and emotion, defense use. of narrative undercuts 
the avowed goal of achieving a "reasoned moral response" to defen­
dants and their crimes.109 Beyond raising constitutional concern, 
opening the floodgates of. emotion only adds to the public perception 
that the system is arbitrary and out of control,110 and unduly influenced 
by melodramatic spectacle.111 Moreover, as Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has observed, emotionalism is not a territory on which abolitionists 
should be eager to wage battle, given that emotion is "far more likely 
to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him. "112 In ulti­
mate terms, therefore, the question is not so much whether narrative 
and emotion are available and will be used. The question is to what 
ends are they to be legitimately put and what legal and moral conse­
quences flow as a result.113 
Sarat's advocacy of inmate "stories" for broader political purposes, 
moreover, is itself interesting in that it highlights a central tension in 
abolitionist strategy. For some time, as soci�l movements historian 
Herbert Haines has observed, conflict has existed between abolitionist 
activists and capital defenders over which should take precedence: the 
short-term goal of evading or overturning particular death verdicts or 
the long-term goal of abolitionism, goals that at times work at cross­
purposes.1 14 As Haines observes, "[p]rofessional ethics require diligent 
108. For instance, at one point Sarat asserts that defendants' "narratives test the power 
of the victims' rights movement, making space to claim that their clients too are victims." 
P. 172. 
109. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("It is of vital importance to 
the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and 
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."). 
110. See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to 
Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1403-04 (noting that emotion is everywhere in capi­
tal trials and that "emotions are holding forth on all sides"). On the broader benefits and 
pitfalls of emotion in the law, see THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Sam­
uel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989). 
111. See Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama and the Rise of the Victims' Rights 
Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665 (1999-2000); Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering 
the Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 
6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
112. Brown, 479 U.S. at 543. 
113. I am indebted to Professor Susan Bandes for enlightening me on this point. 
114. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 118-30. 
It is worth noting that Sarat's characterization of appellate defense counsel serving both 
as advocates for abolition, and for their particular clients, suggests that Haines overstates the 
division between the litigator and activist camps. The dual role, however, itself presents an 
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defense lawyers to take the side of their clients in public, but most ac­
tivists now seem to understand that any focusing of attention on the 
sympathetic qualities of inmates must be done with the utmost 
care."115 The risk, as Haines notes, is that abolitionists will be viewed 
as being "in sympathy with criminals . . . .  Activists have a great deal of 
work to do to overcome this view, and part of their success in doing so 
will be determined by the finesse with which they manage the pres­
ence of condemned killers in the American imagination."116 
With his advocacy of litigation "stories," Sarat signals his contin­
ued fealty to "lawyerly" abolitionism, s�eming to ignore the hard­
learned lesson that successful trial tactics do not always translate posi­
tively to the public.117 This oversight is curious because When the State 
Kills otherwise evinces an acute sensitivity to the potentially adverse 
public relations effects of abolitionist strategy. Later, in the closing 
pages of the book, Sarat echoes Haines when he harshly criticizes ef­
forts to publicly humanize condemned inmates, chiefly McVeigh, but 
also Missouri death row denizens, the latter by the Italian clothing 
company Benetton by means of a pictorial catalog with personalizing 
information ("We, On Death Row"). To Sarat, the two efforts re­
quired anti-death penalty forces to "take on the political burden of 
explaining" that which is politically unsustainable (pp. 249-50). It is 
interesting question. To Sarat, appellate counsel serve as "historians": "making a record thus 
links lawyering for an individual client with the broader, political goal of ending state killing 
in an imagined future." P. 181. This position is consistent with Sarat's prior work with Stuart 
Scheingold. See CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). But should capital counsel 
"build a record" for any purpose other than to benefit their immediate clients? One litigator, 
for instance, told Sarat that counsel must tell courts 
what they don't want to hear. We have to be willing to say what they would rather we not 
say, things that today will be called irrelevant or frivolous. We have to do this because at 
some point in time, even in cases we lose, we are not going to have the chance ten years from 
now to go back and complete the story. We have to do it now . . .  I think that the greatest 
service I can do for a client before he is executed is to be sure that they will not go anony­
mously, quietly, that they will be part of history. Breaking through that anonymity, that is 
what our work is all about. 
Pp. 180-81. 
115. HAINES, supra note 17, at 127. 
116. Id. at 130. 
117. Telling evidence of this arose in the capital prosecution of Susan Smith for drown­
ing her two young children in the family car. See Tom Morgenthau, Condemned to Life, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19. Jurors rejected the death penalty, concluding that Smith 
was "a really disturbed person" and execution "wouldn't serve justice." Id. at 23. National 
public opinion diverged: 63% of those polled felt that Smith deserved to die, and only 28% 
agreed with the outcome. Id. at 20. The divergence might be explained by the understand­
able empathic response of jurors faced with a choice about the fate of a fellow resident in a 
small community, versus regarding the accused as an abstract subject of discussion, based on 
incomplete reportage, outside the jury box. Cf Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Deci­
sion Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal Assumptions, Empirical Findings, and Re­
search Agenda, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1992) (discussing data showing weak predic­
tive value of controlled simulations of jury death decisions). 
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hard enough, Sarat suggests, to defend a capital defendant in the real­
time world of capital trials; it is "impossible to do so in the hurly-burly 
of political contest."11 8  The reader is obliged to ask, however: how do 
these humanizing efforts differ, logically, from telling and archiving 
the "stories" of the condemned individual denizens of death row? 
More practically, why do such stories hold more promise for aboli­
tionist success than Benetton's campaign and sympathetic accounts of 
McVeigh's personal background, which he· so harshly criticizes? 
Sarat unfortunately does not provide answers, leaving unaddressed 
a tactical problem that has vexed the abolitionist cause for some time. 
In the end, the problem arguably does not lie so much in principle but 
in application. Abolitionists can achieve success by putting a "human 
face" on the condemned but they would be well-advised to be selec­
tive about the faces they proffer for public consumption. The visage 
and life story of McVeigh, for instance, might not inspire empathy or 
anti-capital sentiment, but that of a wrongfully condemned man freed 
from death row logically will. 
C. The Cultural Effects 
In the book's final part, Sarat shifts his focus to the "cultural repre­
sentations and resonances of capital punishment, the connection be­
tween what we see and what we believe! about state killing and the 
American condition" (pp. 28-29). Sarat recognizes that punishment 
generally, and capital punishment in particular, holds importance for 
its instructional value - what Sarat calls the "pedagogy of the scaf­
fold" (p. 23). By this he means something more than the age-old ca­
nard that the death penalty will deter those privileged to witness the 
state's awesome exercise of raw power.119 Rather, Sarat is interested in 
118. P. 249. In a footnote, Sarat elaborates on why Benetton's effort was a "step back-
ward" for the abolitionist cause: 
It asks readers to identify, or at least sympathize, with those on death row, reminding us that 
whatever they have done they have the capacity to love and be loved, to hope and fear, to 
laugh, and to repent. There is no reason to think that another such effort, no matter how 
glamorous or powerful its sponsor, will succeed. Indeed, there is reason to fear that it will 
distract attention from the issues that today may be changing attitudes toward the death 
penalty. 
P. 312 n.13. For a similar observation, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 133-34 
(stating that "[t]he idealization of the denizens of death row" obscures "the most powerful 
argument against execution in a liberal democracy and the most fundamental of all argu­
ments against the death penalty": the offender's basic humanity, not his personal traits or 
prior good works). 
119. · see Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the Public and the Press in 
Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 477 (1995). Of course, this notion had 
to compete with the empirical reality that the witnessing crowds were crime-prone, and vola­
tile, which over time encouraged governments to carry out executions in more private ven­
ues. See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 29-30 (1989). 
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the methods of execution and how they are portrayed (or not) by gov­
ernment, and how this affects our "condition." He explores this rich 
terrain by reflecting upon an interesting historical development: while 
over the past several decades executions themselves have come to be 
conducted behind prison walls, often at night and witnessed by a select 
few, the American movie industry has made executions and the stories 
of condemned prisoners the frequent focus of attention. Sarat uses this 
contrast to good effect, exploring the significance of the state's refusal 
to permit public consumption of first-hand visual imagery of execu­
tions and how this vacuum has been filled by Hollywood. 
In Chapter Seven, "To See or Not to See: On Televising Execu­
tions," Sarat contemplates the practical and symbolic meaning of the 
state's blackout of executions.12° To Sarat, there is no mistaking the 
practical motivation: limiting the visibility of state-imposed death is 
"part of the modern bureaucratization of capital punishment and the 
strategy for transforming execution from an arousing public spectacle 
of vengeance to a soothing matter of mere administration."121 Like the 
state's embrace of the clean and clinical execution method of lethal 
injection122 and the preclusion in capital trials of evidence relating to 
the physical effects of actual executions,123 Sarat sees the sequestration 
of death as part of a broader effort to render less visceral the ultimate 
consequence of capital law. In symbolic terms, sequestration contrib­
utes to the "silencing of the condemned" (p. 189) and the "relative in­
visibility" of state killing (p. 191), which together contribute to the po­
litical sustainability of the death penalty. 
Making an argument that owes as much to Brandeis124 as it does to 
Foucalt,125 Sarat vigorously argues that executions should be televised. 
120. The ban has not extended to the aural. Recently, National Public Radio aired audio 
tapes of several executions in Georgia during the period 1983-1998, obtained from defense 
counsel who secured the tapes by means of discovery. Sara Rimer, Sounds of the Georgia 
Death Chamber Will Be Heard on Public Radio, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A12. Included 
in the tapes are the botched electrocutions of two men, complete with the chillingly bureau­
cratic responses of prison officials forced to complete the job. Id. Among the many eerie 
comments one hears are the words of the Georgia Attorney General, on the phone from 
Atlanta, complimenting the warden for a "very smooth job." Id. · 
121. P. 189. Sarat of course is not alone in this view. See, e.g. , JOHN·D. BESSLER, DEATH 
IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 211 (1997) (asserting that "[w]ithout 
televised executions, Americans will always lack complete information as they .debate the 
morality of the death penalty"). 
122. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra note 103. 
124. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Richard M. Abrams ed., 
Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914) (stating that "[s]unlight is said to be best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman"). 
125. FOUCAULT, supra note 89 (arguing that the evolution of the criminal justice system 
over the centuries has been marked by an increasing effort to hide from view the state's pe­
nological methods). 
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He takes as his foil Professor Wendy Lesser who, in a prior book, 
urged that executions not be televised because doing so would be in­
decent and voyeuristic: " 'We, from the invisibility of our private living 
rooms, are given the opportunity to peer into the most intimate event 
in someone else's life: his death.' "126 This invasion, Lesser asserts, 
would be in " 'extremely bad taste' " (p. 205). Sarat, with justification, 
skewers Lesser for her squeamishness, but not on this ground alone. 
To Sarat, "[t]he death of the condemned is in no sense just his own 
death. And the question of whether executions should be televised is 
more than a question of manners" (p. 205). 
Sarat sees the question, ultimately, as a political one. According to 
Sarat, "[t]elevising executions would mean changing the terms of con­
trol, removing state killing from the bureaucratic domain, and recog­
nizing its political configuration" (p. 206). "Control over vision is . . .  a 
question of control over execution itself" (p. 205); "the elision of the 
visual helps state killing to appear different from violence outside of 
law" (p. 207). Televising executions, Sarat urges, is therefore "one way 
of contesting the bureaucratic cover-up" (p. 207). In adopting this po­
sition, Sarat recognizes that television might understate an important 
prong of the abolitionist argument - the broader human effects of 
execution (e.g., the years on death row, the damage to the families of 
the condemned) - and "fool us into thinking that we understand what 
is in truth inaccessible" (p. 199). However, to him the solution lies in 
"more searching media scrutiny of the entire process of execution."127 
Even if one agrees with the governmental transparency argument, 
it is debatable whether televising executions will facilitate abolition. 
The imagery will likely have some effect; the question is what form it 
will take. As Richard Sherwin has recently written, "[o]nce you enter 
the realm of appearances it may be difficult to control how the image 
spins. "12 8 Sarat appears confident that the visage of execution will itself 
threaten the status quo ante of the killing state;12 9  that the intrinsic 
humanity of the viewing public will recoil from the savagery once it is 
126. P. 205 (quoting WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE SUBJECT OF MURDER 40 (1993)). 
127. Pp. 199-200. Sarai fails to explain, however, why the television industry would un­
dertake such a "more searching" inquiry. Indeed, there is every reason to think that, as with 
virtually all else in the ratings-driven industry, television will seek sensationalism and 
graphic display, and not distinguish itself in a positive way. Thus, if in fact the inevitable 
snapshot imagery does provide a misleadingly narrow portrayal of capital punishment, 
Sarat's position would appear to be undercut. 
128. Richard K. Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Appearances, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
821, 821-22 (1999-2000). 
129. See p. 206 (stating that "execution, even execution by lethal injection, seems . . .  a 
throwback to earlier, more savage times . . . .  Televising execution would mean changing the 
terms of control . . . .  "). 
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actually viewed.13° However, it is entirely possible that, in an era in 
which the muted visage of lethal injection has become the norm, pub­
lic outrage over state killing will be similarly muted. As much was sug­
gested by the prevalent response that McVeigh's death was too 
"easy," an unjustifiably humane and dignified means of providing 
"just deserts;"131 
Thus, in ultimate terms, while televising executions might be laud­
able in democratic principle, it remains uncertain whether the sunlight 
cast on this dark crevice of the law will benefit the abolitionist cause.132 
This is especially so if public viewing of executions becomes more 
common and less sensational, a likely occurrence in an era when the 
gripping travails of "Reality TV'' initially garnered high viewer ratings 
that have since leveled off considerably.133 In short, with routinization 
and visual familiarity, a malaise might set in,134 a prospect that is ar­
guably less likely if executions remain secretive affairs left to individ­
ual imagination and all it conjures.135 
130. Albert Camus advanced this same view several decades ago, stating that "[t]he sur­
vival of such a primitive rite has been made possible only by the thoughtlessness or igno­
rance of the public." ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, 
REBELLION, AND DEATH 177 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1961). Addressing himself to use of the 
guillotine, Camus confidently deduced that "if people are shown the machine, made to touch 
the wood and steel and to hear the sound of the head falling, then public imagination, sud­
denly awakened, will repudiate both the vocabulary and the penalty." Id. 
131. · See Jim Yardley, Execution on TV Brings Little Solace, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, 
at A26. This sentiment was. reinforced by the austere accounts of media witnesses and the 
prison warden. See NBC News: Today, Continuation of Penitentiary Warden Harley Lappin's 
Announcement of Timothy McVeigh's 'Death; Media Witnesses Report on the Execution, June 
11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23799332. 
132. Support for this view was evidenced in the joust between Justices Blackmun and 
Scalia in Callins. Blackmun, at the outset of his dissent, darkly intoned the following descrip­
tion of Callins's impending execution: "Intravenous tubes attached to his arms will carry the 
instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifically for the purpose of killing human be­
ings." Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Scalia countered that Callins's demise was preferable to that of his victim, who 
was "ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare himself 
and his affairs, and left to bleed to death on the floor of a tavern. The death-by-injection 
which Justice Blackmun describes looks pretty desirable next to that." Id. at 1 142 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari). Scalia then proceeded to ridicule his colleague for choos­
ing a comparatively benign murder, unlike the brutal rape and murder of an eleven-year-old 
girl in another case then before the Court, adding: "How enviable. a quiet death by lethal 
injection compared with that! "  Id. at 1143. 
133. Scott Brown, Unreal World: Reality TV is Losing Its Audience (Apr. 15, 2002), 
available at http:l/www.ew.com/report/0,6115,181309-3--,00.html. I am indebted to Profes­
sors Doug Berman and David Logan for this insight. 
134. Interestingly, Sarat makes no mention here or elsewhere of the so-called "brutali­
zation" effect of executions, which would logically be enhanced with wider public access. 
Under this view, publicized executions brutalize members of society and encourage killings, 
insofar as killing is seen as being legitimized by governmental executions. For an overview of 
the extensive empirical work testing this theory, see John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Cham­
lin, Deterrence and Brutalization: The Dual Effects of Executions, 17 JUST. Q. 685 (2000). 
135. This view is shared by seasoned death penalty lawyer David Bruck, whom Lesser 
quotes: "The truth of the matter is that the public's imagination of what it must be like -
1362 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:1336 
Americans, however, are not totally bereft of visual imagery of 
capital punishment. The movie industry has come to the rescue, pro­
viding fictionalized accounts of death row denizens in numerous films, 
spanning several decades. These film depictions have catered to the 
modern human craving for visual images, the appeal of which, as 
Walter Lippmann noted, is that they seemingly come "directly to us 
without human meddling, [making them] the most effortless food of 
the mind conceivable."136 Movies thus enjoy : a compelling quasi­
verisimilitude, enhanced by the dramatic talents of Hollywood. The 
upshot is that movies today have complemented, and pervasively in­
fluenced, what Sarat calls "our own legitimating narratives" of capital 
punishment (p. 207). 
With this background, Sarat provides in the book's final chapter an 
incisive analysis of three movies released in the 1990s that have filled 
the visual void, productions he considers "important interventions in 
the debate about capital punishment": Dead Man Walking, Last 
Dance, and The Green Mile (p. 211). Sarat regards the films as signifi­
cant not so much for any revelations they contain but rather for their 
dramaturgical value; the films are worthy objects of analysis because 
of their "cultm;al politics" and "the way they convey knowledge of 
capital punishment" (p. 211). 
Sarat provides a painstaking analysis of the three films, ultimately 
criticizing them for their tendency to legitimize state killing. His first 
basis for concern is that the films, to varying degrees, highlight and ul­
timately foster simplistic views of individual blame and responsibility, 
much as government prosecutors themselves do in capital trials. By fo­
cusing on what is often portrayed as the unalloyed free will of actors 
(i.e., whether the condemned ."did it"), Sarat reasons, the films at once 
provide the viewing public an explanation for violent criminal behav­
ior and a justification for state killing (i.e., the condemned "deserves" 
to die). In Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, this takes the form of 
condemned individuals trying to reconcile before death their admitted 
barbarous acts; the Green Mile, in turn, constitutes a passion play in 
which a wrongly condemned, Christ-like inmate struggles unsuccess­
fully to avoid the death penalty. 
As Sarat observes, there is a practical reason for the films' strategy 
to cast capital punishment in stark terms of moral responsibility and 
blame: the social and structural conditions that figure in the lives of 
and I say this having seen two of these executions take place - the public's imagination is 
much truer than what they would see on TV." LESSER, supra note 126, at 142. 
136. STUART EWEN, PR! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 153 (1996) (quoting Lippmann). 
See generally THE PERSISTENCE OF HISTORY: CINEMA, TELEVISION, AND THE MODERN 
EVENT (Vivian Sobchack ed., 1996). 
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the condemned would complicate the narrative.137 The films are domi­
nated by a " 'bilateral individualism,' a response to crime that ignores 
or brackets the difficult question of what kinds of social conditions 
breed crime."138 Sarat thus sees the films as the embodiment of a "con­
servative cultural politics," despite the overt impression that they are 
predominantly abolitionist in nature (p. 213). They are conservative 
because they view crime purely as a matter of personal autonomy -
the "narrative of responsibility" (p. 228) - channeling viewer focus 
toward this unadorned question, suggesting that it is tQ.e end-all of the 
capital punishment debate.139 
Sarat's second primary concern relates to the way in which the 
films portray actual executions. The films, he writes, "are unusually 
preoccupied with the techniques and technologies of execution, 
showing, often in minute detail, how those technologies work and 
what their effects are on the body of the condemned" (p. 233). Such 
representations falsely "convey a confident comprehensiveness" 
(p. 238) and include inter alia, from the Green Mile (set in circa 1930s 
Louisiana), the botched electrocution of an inmate. This mishap, Sarat 
infers, is to be taken as a reassurance that there should be no concern 
when government carries out a "normal" execution (p. 239). At bot­
tom, then, film representations of actual executions are also culturally 
conservative, and serve the broader cause of preserving the practice of 
state killing. 
Sarat's analysis is accurate as far as it goes. The celluloid version of 
state killing is surely uni-dimensional, and this tendency likely abets 
the continued use of capital punishment. However, one is left to won­
der whether Sarat is asking too much of Hollywood. The movies, after 
all, are just that - movies; they are commercial products created and 
promoted to appeal to the mass consuming public.140 As such, it should 
be expected that they would conform to the formulaic demands of the 
Hollywood idiom, and yes, be cast in a "culturally conservative" way 
conducive to the legal . status quo. Nor can we realistically expect 
137. See p. 232 (stating that the films "refute broad narratives of responsibility that 
would implicate us all in the circumstances that produce crime and would undermine the 
moral and legal scaffolding on which the apparatus of punishment is built"). 
138. P. 214 (quoting Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 
421, 426 (1988)). 
139. Cf David R. Dow, Fictional Documentaries and Truthful Fictions: The Death Pen­
alty in Recent American Film, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 511 ,  512 (2000) (observing that cine­
matic focus on innocence "permit[s] viewers to oppose a death penalty without opposing the 
death penalty. In real life, we do not have that indulgence"). Dow argues that, compared to 
documentaries, which most often focus on innocence, fictional films "do a far better job of 
illuminating the entirety of the death penalty world," insofar as they address the "moral 
complexity" of the system independent of innocence. Id. at 512, 514. 
140. As David Dow has recently written, "[w]hen it comes to death, most Hollywood 
movies cheat. They cheat by tinkering with the truth, because the truth as it actually is is too 
complex or too disturbing to confront honestly." Dow, supra note 139, at 511 .  
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profit-driven Hollywood to tackle "large questions about what state 
killing does to our law, politics, and our culture," as Sarat urges 
(p. 213). 
III. SARAT'S "NEW ABOLITIONISM" 
In the conclusion of When the State Kills, Sarat elaborates on his 
"new abolitionism," and offers some insight into the unabashed prag­
matic motivation behind its origin. As he does throughout the book, 
Sarat holds fast to the view that capital punishment has a pernicious 
influence on America's law, politics and culture.141 In the final pages, 
however, Sarat reaches beyond the cultural studies orientation that 
predominates in the book and embraces more conventional, systemic 
concerns, similar to those motivating Justice Blackmun's famous aboli­
tionist conversion in Callins v. Collins142 and the death penalty mora­
toria movement.143 To Sarat, these developments lie with the grain of 
his new abolitionism,144 despite the fact that both Blackmun's conver­
sion and the moratoria were motivated by concern over system mal­
function,145 with attendant constitutional implications, rather than the 
more nuanced "cultural" harms identified by Sarat in the body of his 
141. See, e.g., p. 250 ("[S]tate killing diminishes our democracy, legitimating vengeance, 
intensifying racial divisions, and distracting us from the new challenges that the new century 
poses for America. It promises simple solutions to complex problems and offers up moral 
simplicity in a morally ambiguous world."). 
142. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145, 1157 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(concluding, after twenty years of "tinker[ing] with the machinery of death," that "the death 
penalty cannot be administered in accord with our Constitution"). For a discussion of Justice 
Blackmun's conversion, see Jeffrey B. King, Now Turn to the Left: The Changing Ideology of 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 33 Haus. L. REV. 277 (1996). 
143. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
144. See p. 259 (stating that they have succeeded in "calling our attention to the condi­
tion of America, its laws, its culture, its commitments as a way of framing the debate about 
state killing"); pp. 259-60 ("[T]hey remind us that the post-Furman effort to rationalize 
death sentencing has utterly failed and has been replaced by a policy that favors execution 
while trimming away procedural protection for capital defendants."); p. 260 (they have re­
minded us of "the spirit of vengeance and cultural division that attend the death penalty"). 
145. In Blackmun's case, his late-in-life reversal was fueled by a palpable frustration 
over, among other things, the persistent failure of capital systems to accommodate the dual 
requirements of individualization and consistency in juror death decisionmaking: 
[D)espite the efforts of the States and the courts to devise legal formulas and procedural 
rules . . .  the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and 
mistake .... Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrari­
ness and discrimination from the administration of death . . .  can never be achieved without 
compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairness - individualized sen-
tencing. 
· 
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1 144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For its part, the 
ABA advocated a moratorium in the name of "fixing" a long list of unaddressed pro.blems 
with the capital system, and avoided a categorical bar "based on the morality or the advis­
ability of capital punishment per se." See A.B.A., supra note 3, at 15; see also id. at 1 (ac­
knowledging that "the Association takes no position on the death penalty"). 
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book.146 This apparent disconnect, however, is ultimately of little effect 
because Sarat is able to successfully argue that the systemic concerns 
motivating Justice Blackmun and the moratoria provide yet another 
amoral, pragmatic basis to resist state killing that comports with his 
new abolitionism: that the death penalty cannot be "administered in a 
manner that is compatible with our legal system's fundamental com­
mitments to fair and equal treatment."147 
To Sarat, such an emphasis on due process and equal protection -
rather than "frontal" Eighth Amendment arguments, sounding in 
moral philosophy and explicit concern for the condemned - is "con­
servative" and consistent with the fairness-oriented "spirit of 
Furman. "14 8 By targeting these systemic concerns, Sarat contends, 
abolitionists are provided 
a position of political respectability while simultaneously allowing them 
to change the subject from the legitimacy of execution to the imperatives 
of due process, from the philosophical merits of killing the killers to the 
sociological question of the impact of state killing on our politics, law and 
culture . . .  [Abolitionists] can say that the most important issue in the 
debate about capital punishment is one of fairness, not one of sympathy 
for murderers, concern for the law abiding, not for the criminal. We 
should not let our central democratic and legal values be eroded just so 
that we can execute evildoers. (p. 253) 
Sarat thus sells his "new abolitionism" as a preferable alternative 
to traditional abolitionism, which for the past several decades has 
146. The move is somewhat jarring and serves as a reminder that several of the book's 
chapters were previously published elsewhere, being modified for purposes of inclusion in 
When the State Kills. In a broader sense, it suggests what might be perceived as uncertainty 
over the basic interdisciplinary approach advanced in the book, i.e., despite the promise of 
such scholarship, in the end, the anti-capital campaign is about basic legal and jurispruden­
tial concerns, not nuanced social construction. For discussions of the pitfalls of interdiscipli­
nary legal scholarship more generally, see J.M. Balkin, lnterdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1996); Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in 
Search of a Paradigm, 42 DUKE L.J. 840 (1990). 
147. P. 251. Of Blackmun's conversion, Sarat writes: 
Blackmun's abolitionism found its locus in neither liberal humanism nor radicalism nor re­
ligious doctrine, nor in the defense of the most indefensible among us. It is, instead, firmly 
rooted in the mainstream legal values of due process and equal protection and in a deep 
concern with what state killing does to the condition of America. Blackmun did not reject 
the death penalty because of its violence, argue against its inappropriateness as a response to 
heinous criminals, or criticize its futility as a tool in the war against crime. Instead, he shifted 
the rhetorical grounds. 
P. 252. Similarly, much like Sarat, in backing a moratorium the ABA espoused a position of 
moral neutrality on the death penalty. See A.B.A., supra note 3. 
148. P. 251. Furman's result, it is worth recalling, was animated by process-based con­
cerns, although cast as a successful Eighth Amendment challenge. See Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (opinion of Stewart, J., concurring) (condemning the death penalty 
as arbitrary and "capricious," making death "cruel and unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual"); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) 
(noting that "(t]he basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being 
condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily"). 
1366 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1336 
fruitlessly pursued a "frontal assault on the morality of state killing" 
(p. 251 ). It is a "kind of legal and political conservatism" that seeks to 
cultivate "anxiety" over the continued use of the death penalty and 
subvert its popularity based on its irreconcilable conflict with Ameri­
can legal ideals of fairness and equality, ideals embodied in our consti­
tutional texts and traditions (p. 252). In due course, Sarat hopes, no 
longer will opposition to capital punishment so much be synonymous 
with being "soft on crime"14 9  as · with fealty to cherished democratic 
traditions. 
· 
By "chang[ing] the subject," Sarat seemingly achieves at least two 
positive outcomes. First, he frees himself from what he sees as the his­
torically felt abolitionist need to "explain[] why the state should not 
kill people like Timothy McVeigh" (p. 23). Until now, "to be against 
the death penalty one has had to defend the life of Timothy Mc Veigh" 
(p. 2.49), a manifestly unpopular political position.150 According to 
Sarat, " [ o ]ne can, abolitionists are now able to concede, believe in the 
retributive or deterrence-based rationales for the death penalty and 
yet still be against the death penalty; one can still be as tough on crime 
as the next person yet still reject state killing."151 
Second, and perhaps more important, changing the subject permits 
the debate over capital punishment to be framed in terms more con­
ducive to .ultimate abolitionist victory. McVeigh, like predecessor 
death penalty "poster bc;lys" Eichman, Dahmer, and Gacy, put tradi­
tional abolitionists in a difficult spot. Compelled to subscribe to the 
principled position that state killing is always wrong, even for such 
singularly evil men, traditionalists risked being denounced as philo­
sophic zealots of questionable sincerity. To emphasize his point, Sarat 
offers an instance of how a "frontal" assault can do more harm than 
149. See Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Re­
sponse to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 21 (1982) (concluding same 
on basis of survey data). 
150. The public strongly supported McVeigh's execution. See Richard Willing, Even for 
Death Penalty Foes, McVeigh is the Exception, USA TODAY, May 4, 2001, at Al (noting that 
in USA Today/Gallup Poll 81 % of respondents backed McVeigh's execution). The support 
was palpable even among death penalty opponents. Id. (noting that more than half of death 
penalty opponents polled supported McVeigh's execution); cf Rob Hotakainen & Jessica 
Thompson, A Deserved Death Sentence? Opinion Split on Capitol Hill, STAR-TRIB . 
(MINNEAPOLIS), June 9, 2001, at A8 (noting that liberal U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, an 
outspoken abolitionist, did not object to McVeigh's execution). 
151. P. 253-54. With these words, one senses that the abolitionist cause has been cowed 
by the sustained defense of pro-death forces such as Justice Antonin Scalia, and on Scalia's 
own terms. As Justice Scalia stated in response to Justice Blackmun's Eighth Amendment­
based renunciation of the death penalty in Callins: 
If the people conclude that ... brutal deaths may be deterred by capital punishment; indeed, 
if they merely conclude that justice requires such brutal deaths to be avenged by capital 
punishment; the creation of false, untextual and unhistorical contradictions within "the 
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence" should not prevent them. 
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. ,1141, 1143 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
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good and can be averted with tactical gain. This event occurred during 
the 1988 presidential campaign when Democratic candidate Michael 
Dukakis, in response to a hypothetical question asking whether his 
anti-death penalty position would change if his wife were raped and 
murdered, stated merely that he was "against the death penalty" 
(p. 248). To Sarat, Dukakis would have better served abolitionism, 
and certainly his own election .hopes,152 if he had candidly admitted the 
visceral satisfaction of the death. penalty in such a circumstance but 
still condemned its use. Sarat offers what to him would have been a 
preferable riposte for Dukakis: 
Of course, I would want anyone who did such a thing to someone I loved 
to be made to suffer. Indeed, if I got my hands on him I'd tear him limb 
from limb. But the death penalty. is something different. What my love 
and anger propels me to .do is not what our government should do. It 
should help heal my pain, but also find ways to punish that do more than 
exact the most primitive kind of vengeance. (p. 248) 
In one fell swoop Sarat thus appears to resolve what might be 
called the "abolitionist's conundrum" and alters the terms of the de­
bate. By framing the death penalty in such starkly personal terms, as 
Professor Herbert Haines has observed, pro-death penalty forces have 
long discomfited abolitionists, much as when they have been forced to 
def end the lives of Eichman and Mc Veigh: 
If they admit that they, too, might want vengeance should a loved one be 
murdered; their efforts to take away the state's power to execute smacks 
of hypocrisy. But if they refuse to acknowledge the revenge motive, they 
appear detached and unfeeling. Indeed, the stereotype of abolitionists as 
disproportionately sympathetic to the guilty and deaf to the cries of in­
nocent victims has seriously compromised the legitimacy of the move­
ment.153 
Sarat thus avoids being branded a zealot, and manages to comman­
deer the terrain of the death penalty debate by, as he suggests, chang­
ing the subject. The issue becomes not whether McVeigh "deserves" 
death, or whether we as individuals would want to kill the murderer of 
a loved one. Rather, the focus is on the broader inimical effects of 
capital punishment on our law, society and culture. 
Sarat's avowed desire to "change the subject," however, begs two 
questions: (1) can in fact the subject so readily be changed and (2) 
what are the potential consequences to abolitionism of such a strat­
egy? 
152. See Susan Estrich, The Hidden Politics of Race, WASH. POST MAG., Apr. 23, 1989, 
at 20, 22 (manager of Dukakis campaign acknowledging that debate response was detrimen­
tal to campaign). 
153. HAINES, supra note 17, at 106-07. 
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A. Changing the Subject 
In seeking to convince Americans that capital punishment is inimi­
cal to their "condition," Sarat takes on a substantial, if not insuper­
able, task. Numerous studies have established that one's position on 
the death penalty is significantly influenced by broader, often deeply 
felt social and political views. On this question, people self-identify; 
they "do not so much form opinions [regarding the death penalty] as 
choose sides."154 Also, as Sarat recognizes, there is permanence to the 
urge to punish; what sociologist Emile Durkheim called the "expiatory 
character of punishment,"155 and the Gregg Court identified as soci­
ety's need to express "moral outrage at particularly offensive con­
duct."156 To be sure, the death penalty - given the relative infre­
quency of its application - possesses largely symbolic significance.157 
But even symbolic sanction, as Durkheim so perceptively noted, plays 
a role: it affords society a chance to express moral solidarity; society 
gets to "express the unanimous aversion which the crime continues to 
inspire, by an authentic act which can consist only in suffering inflicted 
upon the agent."15 8 
154. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' 
Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 19, 23 (1994); see also LOUIS MICHAEL 
SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 162-63 (1996) (noting that "expression of opinion about capital 
punishment is a way of defining oneself and signaling to others which side one is on"); Sam­
uel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty - It's Getting Per­
sonal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1452 (1998) (concluding that "[f]or most Americans, a po­
sition on capital punishment is an aspect of self-identification"). 
155. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simp­
son trans., The Free Press 1933) (1893) (noting that " [c]rime brings together upright con­
sciences and concentrates them"). 
156. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). The Court hastened to add that the 
outlet might be "unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its 
citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." Id. 
Even more vexing, the persistent support for capital punishment might have a far 
deeper, more psychic dimension, if indeed executions serve as acts of "ritual human sacri­
fice," better explained "as an unconscious psychological defense mechanism against fear of 
mortality awareness than a deliberate practical response to crime." Donald P. Judges, Scared 
to Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror Management, 33 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 
155, 163, 181 (1999); cf MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED 
PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 102-18 (1996) (pro­
viding a psychoanalytic, literature-based examination of the conflicting admiration and dis­
dain felt for criminal offenders). 
157. See Gross, supra note 154, at 1452; Tyler & Weber, supra note 149, at 37; cf Doug­
las Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND 
SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 20-25, 46-49 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 
1975) (recounting how English gentry resorted to executions infrequently, despite Jaws 
making death virtually mandatory for a wide array of crimes, thereby inspiring both respect 
for state power and the image of a merciful sovereign). 
158. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 108. For a comprehensive treatment of the social, 
political, and economic factors combining to perpetuate punishment in its many forms, see 
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To Sarat, this visceral fealty to the death penalty is beside the 
point. It will endure regardless of'the·persuasiveness of abolitionist ar­
guments, and seeking to combat it can actually handicap abolitionism. 
However, it is worth asking whether the abolitionist cause can so eas­
ily sidestep what Sarat calls the "moral" underpinnings of capital pun­
ishment, the "simple and appealing retributivist rationale for capital 
punishment" (p. 249). The urge to punish capitally, although indulged 
at varying rates over the years, endures after centuries of criticism, and 
there is no reason to think it will dissipate on its own. Only today, 
however, has the public's core justification for the death penalty 
limned, with retribution finally having been laid bare.15 9  With other 
"respectable" rationales, such as the armatures of deterrence and cost­
effectiveness,160 now having fallen to the wayside, abolitionists are pre­
sented with a prime opportunity to at last squarely address and refute 
the harsh contours of lex talionis. 
Moreover, by refusing to engage "moral" arguments, Sarat would 
also appear to miss an opportunity, or perhaps more precisely, miscast 
the terms of the debate. The systemic fault currently of most public 
salience - the immanent execution of innocents, both historically161 
and today,162 which Sarat largely ignores163 - does indeed raise moral 
and philosophical concerns. This is because, above all, any punishment 
justified on retributive theory requires culpability.164 Recent public 
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 
(1990). 
159. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
160. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A 
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 1 16, 
149 (1983) (noting that "the belief in deterrence is seen as more 'scientific' or more socially 
desirable than other reasons"). 
161. See, e.g., Bedau, supra note 17, at 434, 436 (identifying seventy-four capital cases 
between 1893 and 1962 as "justice errors") .  The data have prompted Justice O'Connor to 
have "serious questions" about use of the death penalty; "[i)f statistics are any indication, the 
system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed." Maria Elena Baca, 
Justice O 'Connor Critical of the Death Penalty, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), July 3, 2001, at 
Al. 
162. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting one hundredth modem death row 
exoneration). Importantly, only a small proportion of the inmates won their freedom on the 
basis of DNA analysis. See Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria in Execu­
tions, 33 CONN. L. REV. 845, 858 (2001). In this regard, it bears mention that increasing use 
of DNA lessens but does not preclude the conviction of "factually innocent" defendants 
given that DNA is not always present at crime scenes; also, DNA analysis does nothing to 
exonerate or bar from death row defendants whose relative culpability makes them not 
"death-worthy" (i.e., "penalty innocent"). See id. at 857-58. 
163. The only direct reference to innocence made in the book appears in its conclusion. 
Pp. 258-59. 
164. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (stating that " [t)he heart of the retri­
bution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpabil­
ity of the criminal offender"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1981) (O'Connor, J., 
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opinion data suggest that information on innocence has discernible ef­
fect on the otherwise impregnable -retributive supporting rationale,165 
at last providing some support for Justice Marshall's hypothesis,166 
ironically, regarding a penal rationale he categorically rejected.167 The 
acknowledged propensity of the system to be influenced by bias,16 8 al­
though enjoying less resonance with the public,169 similarly undercuts 
retributivism. Armed with these data, abolitionists can undertake a 
"frontal assault," permitting them to seize the initiative and engage re­
tentionists on a more persuasive ground than theory alone.170 Rather 
dissenting) (stating that the death penalty is justified only when "the criminal gets his just 
deserts"). 
165. See Alan W. Clarke et al., Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall 
Hypothesis, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309, 335 (2001) (discussing data suggesting 
that educating respondents about the likely execution of innocents causes a "small but statis­
tically significant" reduction in support for the death penalty). According to the authors, 
"[f]acts do matter, even to a retributivist." Id. at 336. "Even the most staunch adherent of 'an 
eye for an eye' will want to get the right person's eye." Id. at 337; see also Jonathan Rauch, 
Can the Death Penalty Be Saved from Its Supporters?, 32 NAT'L J., 2210, 2211 (2000) (death 
penalty advocate stating that "[i]n moral terms - which, in the long run,.are the only terms 
that really matter - the most important event this year - is the public's growing concern 
about the possibility of executing innocent people"). 
166. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (positing 
that if the public were "fully informed," then a "substantial proportion of American citizens 
would . . .  [consider the death penalty] barbarously cruel . . .  in the light of all information 
presently available"). For a summ·ary of the research casting doubt on Justice Marshall's 
view that Americans will reject capital punishment' if 'informed of its flaws, but noting that 
innocence concerns prove that the support "may not be so immutable," see Theodore Eis­
enberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 378-79 (2001). 
On the questionable capacity of the public to self-educate more generally, see Deborah W. 
Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 753-55 (2000) (discussing 
research documenting widespread public ignorance regarding criminal justice matters). 
167. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 362 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
168. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987) (noting that "[t]here is, of 
course, some risk of racial prejudice" in capital decisions); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 
n.8 (1986) (noting that the largely unfettered discretion afforded capital juries affords 
"greater opportunity for racial prejudice to operate;'). Others have argued that the retribu­
tive rationale is undercut by the acknowledged structural inequities of American society. 
See, e.g. , Jeffrey Reimann, The Justice of the Death Penalty in an Unjust World, in 
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 29 
(Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988). 
169. See Gross, supra note 154, at 1458-59 (noting that "many Americans do not con­
sider discrimination by race or wealth a sufficient reason to oppose capital punishment"); 
Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 
ANN. REV. Soc. 43, 49 (2000) ("While most Americans recognize the problems of race and 
class bias, they do not view such discrimination as a reason to oppose the death penalty."). 
170. See LLOYD STEFFEN, EXECUTING JUSTICE: THE MORAL MEANING OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY (1998) (critiquing moral rationales in support of death penalty on basis of 
system's acknowledged fallibility); Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to 
Do With It?: The Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 
537 (1997) (asserting that "perhaps the most effective way to attack the death penalty is to 
expose its failings, in the real world, to satisfy the demands of retributive theory"); cf 
STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING BY DEATH 9 
(1987) (positing that capital proponents bear the "moral burden of proof' because inten­
tional killing is wrong). 
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than focusing on fairness and equal protection (the mainstays of 
Sarat's strategy), concerns· research has shown are not decisive to 
Americans,171 abolitionists can undertake a "frontal" assault on the 
core retributive base of support, giving tangible form to the abstract 
question of whether it is "morally right" to impose the uniquely severe 
penalty of death, given the ineluctable faults of the capital process.172 
More problematic, by avoiding old-style moral abolitionism, with 
its categorical quality, Sarat's tact might yield to the reformism em­
bodied in Gregg and implicitly endorsed by the proposed ABA Mora­
torium,173 perpetuating a legal complicity that advantages the status 
quo.174 The very continued use of the death penalty, even if limited to 
persons like McVeigh,175 begs the question of whether the abolitionist 
cause might be selling itself short.176 So long as the capital genie is out 
of the bottle, there will remain a strong temptation for government to 
employ executions as a means, if nothing else, to add symbolic luster 
171. See Samuel R. Gross, Still Unfair, Still Arbitrary - But Do We Care?, 26 OHIO 
N.U. L. REv.517, 525 (2000); Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 160, at 135. 
172. See Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Amoral 
Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1 177, 1182-83 (1981) (noting 
that retributivism is "haunted by those executions of the innocent which inevitably occur if 
the death penalty is allowed . . .  "); Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Per­
sons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 143, 1184 (1980) (asserting that re­
tributivism is betrayed by a "system that we know must wrongly kill some (defendants] al­
though we do not know which"). 
173. It is worth noting that the ABA's Resolution itself was backed by only 53% of 
the House of Delegates, suggesting that the public opinion battle, even among highly 
educated Americans who should be keenly sensitive to the fairness concerns outlined 
in the Resolution, is a formidable one. See Michael D. Wiffis, Debating ABA's Death 
Penalty Resolution: Bad Process, Bad Result, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. REP., Fall 1998, at 
18. Public opinion polls of Americans more generally suggest only lukewarm support for 
a moratorium - 53% or 42%, depending on how the question is phrased. See Jeffrey 
M. Jones, Americans Closely Divided on Death Penalty Moratorium, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr0104llc.asp. 
174. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (stating that "the punishment of 
death does not invariably violate the Constitution," and endorsing revamped capital system 
with legislatively enhanced controls). 
175. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 164 (noting that "the benefits of capi­
tal punishment are symbolic: They lie in the statement executions make about the relation­
ship between the government and the offender; in the vindication of absolute and ultimate 
power appropriated to governmental ends, even if this only happens in small number of 
cases"). 
176. Under this view, death is to be reserved for those convicted of a "small category of 
extremely heinous crimes-such as assassinating the President, or murdering police officers or 
multiple victims." James R. Acker & Charles S.' Lanier, Beyond Human Ability? The Rise 
and Fall of Death Penalty Legislation, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 77, 109. Such a limitation would be politically feasible be­
cause it preserves the "symbolic safety net represented by the death penalty," until such time 
as the public comes "to appreciate and accept that the remaining vestiges of capital punish­
ment are both unnecessary and ill-advised." Id. Alternatively, the road toward abolition 
could be charted by discrete categorical prohibitions, such as the execution of juveniles, also 
now getting traction. See A.B.A., supra note 3, at 220 (advocating same). 
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to the power of the state. Although experience in Western Europe 
might suggest otherwise,177 there is no assurance that narrowing the of­
fender class will cause capital punishment to wither away, as sporadic 
use might only serve to sustain the blood lust that quenches America's 
appetite for executions.1 7 8  Indeed, aggressive legislative efforts over 
the past twenty-five years to expand capital aggravating factors and 
the number of death-eligible offenses should provide cause for suspi­
cion that such a diminution will come about.179 On the other hand, in­
cremental political victories, such as occurred in Illinois Republican 
Governor Ryan's bold imposition of a moratorium,1 80 inight well pres­
age ultimate legal abolition by emboldened politicians, again as oc­
curred in Europe.1 81 
177. As Professors Zimring and Hawkins have observed, Western Europe achieved 
abolition by means of a gradual diminution in death-eligible crimes, and consequent infre­
quent use over an extended period, creating at first de facto and later de jure abolition. See 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 4-5, 8-10. 
178. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, 
LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 246 (1987) (stating "(t]his is precisely why, in 
the end, we should oppose the death penalty in principle and without exception. As long as 
capital punishment is available under law for any crime, it is a temptation to excess"). 
179. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of To­
day's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
345 (1998) (noting proliferation of aggravators and arguing that it marks an evolution to­
ward a "mandatory death penalty"); Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 46, at 373 ( observ­
ing that "death-eligibility remains remarkably broad - indeed, nearly as broad as under the 
expansive statutes characteristic of the pre-Furman era"). 
180. See Dirk Johnson, No Executions in Illinois Until System is Repaired, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 2000, at A20; see also Peter Beinart, Mercy Seat, NEW REPUBLIC, June 11 ,  2001, at 
'1!5, at http://www.tnr.com/punditry/beinart061101.html (observing that several recent re­
forms have been initiated by Republican politicians, including in Illinois, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire and Texas, and that "Washington is several years behind public opinion and the 
states" on the issue of reform). 
181. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 12-15, 21-22 (discussing legal changes 
adopted by European officials despite high support for the death penalty among citizens). 
According to Professors Zimring and Hawkins, "in most abolitionist countries, if the issue 
had been decided by direct vote rather than by the legislature, the death penalty probably 
would not have been repealed." Id. at 12. "Successful and sustained abolition of [capital 
punishment] has never been a result of great popular demand." Id.; see also LIFTON & 
MITCHELL, supra note 27, at 247-48 (chronicling abolitionist course in Britain, Canada, and 
France). But cf. Bruce Shapiro, Dead Reckoning: A World Effort to Force an End io the US 
Death Penalty is Gaining Strength, NATION, Aug. 6, 2001, at 18 (noting that while European 
abolitionism has been regarded as "elitist," in June 2001 over 60% of Irish referendum vot­
ers endorsed abolition). 
Albeit temporary, the Illinois moratorium supports the forecast of Professors Zimring 
and Hawkins that, other than the Supreme Court, the most likely path to abolition involves 
state governors, "the political officials most likely to regard the death penalty policy as being 
a crucial part of their responsibility and, therefore, to take action." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, 
supra note 23, at 155; see also id. at 156 (stating that "brave governors and even brave sena­
tors will have to take important roles in demythologizing the politics of capital punishment 
long before the Court acts to end executions"). The authors hasten to add, however, that "it 
should be remembered that state governors have very few models for this sort of bravery in 
recent American experience." Id. at 155. 
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B. The Consequences of Changing the Subject 
Whatever the likely success of Sarat's tactical shift, a perhaps more 
interesting question looms: what, if any, adverse consequences possi­
bly flow from the singularly pragmatic stance he advocates? 
Before addressing this question, it is important to identify what is 
new about Sarat's "new abolitionism" and to be clear about its tactical 
locus. To be sure, it self-consciously seeks tci distance itself from 
Justice Brennan's moral, "human dignity"-based categorical aboli­
tionism invoked in his Furman concurrence,1 82 long a blueprint for the 
abolitionist cause. Nor does it draw explicit support from traditional 
legal or jurisprudential analysis, which has taken its cues from the con­
stitutional claims pending before the Court1 83 or from social science re­
search, which for a time seemed to hold promise for abolition.184 
Rather, it is an approach that places premium importance on pub­
lic and legislative opinion, a tactical realm largely avoided by aboli­
tionists since Gregg when several members of the plurality cited the 
adverse response to Furman as affirmative evidence that the death 
penalty comported with "evolving standards of decency."1 85 Such 
."objective" indicia have remained an important focus of the Court, 
with decidedly mixed results for abolitionists.1 86 There is irony in this 
182. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that " 'moral 
concepts' require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should de­
clare that the punishment of death . . .  is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized soci­
ety"). 
183. See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 154, at 42-43 (recognizing same). 
184. This death knell was perhaps most audible in McClesky v. Kemp in 1987 where the 
Court disregarded the high-quality statistical work of Professor David Baldus and his col­
leagues. See generally James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical 
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 65 (1993). 
Sarat thus appears to have heeded the recognition of Franklin Zimring who, noting the 
relative unresponsiveness of the law to social science research, has argued that the situation 
has freed scholars "of the constraints that might apply if such work was relevant to immedi­
ate decisions on executions." Franklin R. Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 
27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 12 (1993). For a defense of the role of social science research and a 
look at its "long-term percolating effects . . .  on elite and public opinion," see David C. Bal­
dus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social Science, 70 IND. 
L.J. 1033 (1995). 
185. In Gregg, at least four members of the plurality identified the groundswell of new 
capital laws after Furman as evidence of public support for capital punishment. See Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 179, 181 n.25. 
186. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (rejecting effort to ban 
executions of sixteen-year-olds because of absence of national statutory consensus against 
such an exemption, citing laws as "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude"); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) (barring execution of fifteen-year-olds be­
cause all states specifying an age eligibility minimum designated that age as sixteen). Impor­
tantly, the Court has been most deferential to legislatures, and secondarily to juries, ex­
pressing reservations about the use of public opinion polls. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 
2242, 2249 n.21 (2002) (noting that polling data are "by no means dispositive" in assessing 
whether a national consensus exists). · 
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shift, however, as it is reminiscent of the Legal Defense Fund's pre­
Furman political efforts to abolish capital punishment,1 87 a campaign 
that showed tangible (if piecemeal and ephemeral) abolitionist re­
sults. 1 8 8 In a sense, then, Sarat's new abolitionism is perhaps not so 
new after all. 
While to many this approach will no doubt represent a much­
needed turn toward pragmatism and a tonic for the enervated state of 
abolitionism,1 89 Sarat's ready willingness to forsake the "high moral 
ground" might augur collateral trouble. His jettison of McVeigh, in 
particular, is emblematic of this. The sacrifice of the most politically 
despised without a fight itself suggests capitulation, or more precisely, 
a high-stakes barter in which the death penalty combatants seek to 
buy each other off, achieving a bargain reminiscent of Faust.190 The 
obvious risk is that, no matter how shrewd the tactic might appear in 
political terms; it undercuts the basic moral bearing of the anti-death 
penalty movement, heretofore a binding characteristic.191 Much like 
the absolutism characteristic of the debate over legalized abortion, the 
legitimacy of execution to date has not admitted of much middle 
This emphasis on democratic politics, of course, distinguishes Eighth Amendment juris­
prudence from the purposely counter-majoritarian tenor of other constitutional provisions. 
See Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Principled vs. Populist Strate­
gies, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 789, 810 (1996) (noting same). As the Court noted almost 
sixty years ago, "[t]he very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori­
ties . . .  and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
187. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 54; MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 106-25. 
188. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 40-44, 78-79 (recounting how predominant focus on 
judicial abolitionism relegated political abolitionism to the margins, despite the fact that the 
latter showed incremental gains in the pre-Furman period); see also Muller, supra note 30, at 
179 (noting that the litigation-specific focus of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund "simply did 
not consider the difficult task of public education on the death penalty issue as one of its im-
portant responsibilities"). 
· 
189. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (commenting on enervated condition of 
abolitionism); ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 5 
(1996) (noting that "no one can embark upon a study of the death penalty without making 
the commonplace observation that from a philosophical and policy standpoint there appears 
to be nothing new to be said"). 
190. For their part, death penalty supporters can avoid criticism over claims of inno­
cence, racism and inadequate legal counsel, taking heart that the "worst of the worst" do get 
death. Opponents can derive satisfaction in the reality that there will be fewer executions. 
Cf Sam Howe Verhovek, When Justice Shows Its Darker Side, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 
D5 (quoting death penalty supporter's response to assertion that innocents have been con­
demned: "I would gladly give [abolitionists] a couple of questionable cases that they are 
harping about in return for 'their agreeing to recognize that in the vast majority of cases, 
there is no question of the guilt of those being executed"). 
191. See HAINES, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that the movement "has managed to avoid 
the factional splintering that has plagued other crusades in America"). 
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ground.192 By evolving away from absolutism, however, the movement 
cannot shake an irreducible reality: .that .McVeigh, too, was a human 
being. Why was the government's act of exterminating McVeigh not 
"brutal," making us all complicit in his death? Does not the compul­
sion to execute so despised a person as McVeigh speak to Sarat's ulti­
mate subject: the "American condition"?193 Clarence Darrow likely 
would not have hesitated in his unequivocal affirmative response.194 
In addition, coupling abolitionism with political concerns carries 
substantial practical risk. While old-style moral abolitionism, such as 
advanced by Justice Brennan, was certainly susceptible to attack for its 
moral inflexibility, staking abolitionist hopes on the goal of persuading 
Americans of the evil of capital punishment presents risk of a precisely 
opposite kind. One need only consider the periodic wild swings in 
public support for punitiveness amid "crime waves"195 and anxiety­
producing world events196 to know of the significant volatility of public 
192. Indeed, the intellectual tension felt by liberals regarding abortion and capital pun­
ishment likely plays a part in any willingness to compromise on the execution of persons like 
McVeigh. See BEDAU, supra note 178, at 243 (noting that "conscientious liberals" already 
"compromise on other life-and-death issues . . .  thereby showing that they refuse to accept 
any moral principle that categorically condemns all killing. [As a result], what is so peculiarly 
objectionable . . .  in an occasional state-authorized killing of that rare criminal . . .  ?"). On the 
public opinion parallels between abortion arid the death penalty more generally, see 
KIMBERLY J. COOK, DIVIDED PASSIONS: PUBLIC OPINIONS ON ABORTION AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY (1998). 
193. This point was eloquently made fifteen years ago by Professors Zimring and Haw­
kins. While recognizing that death row inmates should not be "idealized," they argued that 
the execution of even the most despised is problematic: "It is the deliberate extinction of 
human life, including that of the ugly, the depraved, and those of any ability to please, that is 
the essential wrong. Executions arrogate to political authority a power that no government 
should be given or take for itself." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 134.; see also 
LIFfON & MITCHELL, supra note 27, at 220-21 (referring to "the McVeigh exception," which 
is arguably the "ultimate test" of capital punishment sentiment). 
194. Indeed, Darrow's renowned defense of Leopold and Loeb provides an illuminating 
parallel. In contrast to the typically downtrodden clients he defended out of political convic­
tion, the teenaged Leopold and Loeb were wealthy, white and intellectually gifted. Darrow, 
however, elected to represent the boys, who confessed and expressed no remorse for killing 
14-year-old Bobby Franks, had them plead guilty, and delivered history's perhaps most elo­
quent (and lengthy) courtroom argument against the death penalty in principle. See 
CLARENCE DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957); Scott 
W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: Darrow's De­
fense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989 (1994). It is worth noting, however, that 
Darrow himself prophesized in 1924 that it would "only be a few years." before the death 
penalty would be abolished in the United States. See DARROW supra note 18, at 40 (re­
counting Darrow's assertion in debate with New York City Judge Alfred J. Talley). 
195. See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 154, at 40, 41 fig.4 (describing increases in public 
support for death penalty in late 1960s through the 1980s in tandem with sharp rises in homi­
cide rates). 
196. The overwhelming support of McVeigh's execution is a case in point. See supra 
note 150. In his Furman concurrence, Justice Marshall noted this same phenomenon, citing 
the "nervous tension" attending World War I, which curtailed abolitionist efforts for dec­
ades. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 339-40 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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views on the death penalty.1 97 In short, standards of decency can and 
do "evolve," and not always in the direction favored by abolitionists. It 
is entirely possible that, while legislatures and the public at-large 
might be expressing reserve about the death penalty today, in the near 
future a far greater level of acceptance might again come to the fore. 
Finally, by eschewing a frontal assault, however difficult, the 
movement also forsakes the promise of achieving a much broader 
philosophic shift in American penology. As one commentator recently 
put it: "Criminal punishment has come to serve as a new civic religion 
of sorts for a society which worries about its ability to cohere, and the 
depths of our anxieties about our social solidarity express themselves 
in our conceptions of crime and in the corresponding severity of our 
punishment."1 9 8  The current social acceptability of execution as a form 
of retribution must be squarely addressed if society is to be purged of 
its desire to execute.1 9 9  As argued by Robert Jay Lifton and Greg 
Mitchell, we as a society must "reject all claims to owning the death of 
anyone else. "200 In other words, something more than rhetoric and 
public perception is involved; the challenge goes to changing Ameri­
cans' core sensibility regarding punishment and atonement.201 Again, 
McVeigh affords a compelling example. If we can take him at his 
word, McVeigh's murderous treachery in Oklahoma City was in­
tended to "avenge" the deaths of the Branch Dividians. The federal 
government, rather than seeking atonement in some nonlethal way, 
perpetuated the killing cycle with its extinguishment of the wan 
McVeigh in the Terre Haute death chamber. With his execution, the 
government missed an optimal chance to reconfigure penal policy, 
precisely at the moment it would engender maximum respect.202 
197. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, at 57 (1987) 
(observing that "the trend of public opinion on capital punishment is among the most vola­
tile in Gallup annals"). 
198. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through 
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831 (2000). 
199. See supra note 19 (citing polling data suggesting that retribution is by far the most 
common justification among death penalty advocates). Curiously, unlike the public, politi­
cians appear reluctant to expressly invoke retribution as a justification, resorting instead to 
deterrence. See Radelet, supra note _162, at 848-54 (noting that the 2000 presidential candi­
dates both invoked deterrence in support of their pro-death positions). Professor Radelet 
suggests that it is "more polite to call [the death penalty] a necessary evil (I do not like it but 
we have to do it to reduce homicide rates) . . . .  " Id. at 853. He observes, however, that ten 
years ago political figures were less squeamish about invoking retribution in support. Id. 
200. LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 27, at 253. 
201. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic 
or Utopian, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727 (1999). As Professor Robert Burt has observed, 
" [c]apital punishment is warfare writ small," insofar as it impedes the prospect for social 
reconciliation. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitu­
tion, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1764 (1987). 
202. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 165 (observing that " [f]ailure to exe­
cute in the face of ordinary homicide does not carry the moral force of refusal to respond in 
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But all this goes to tactics, not substance. In the end, the para­
mount value of When the State Kills is that it advances an intellectual 
framework that allows abolitionists to reinvigorate their cause, which, 
despite some recent gains, has at best achieved a stand-off with pro­
death forces,203 and until very recently has been "virtually invisible."204 
Rather than being a practical "how to" manifesto for the coming 
revolution,205 the book seeks to illuminate a new way of thinking and 
basis to communicate to ambivalent Americans the demonstrated 
faults of the capital system in a manner that (at last) meaningfully 
resonates. The important observations of Professor Sarat in When the 
State Kills should enrich the ongoing debate over capital punishment, 
and, as he seeks, afford yet more reason to question the continued use 
of the capital sanction. At the end of this important book, Sarat asks: 
"As we think about capital punishment, the faces we should be look­
ing at are our own. The question to be asked about state killing is not 
what it does for us, but what it does to us" (p. 250). The question re­
mains, however, whether what we see in the mirror will suffice to end 
state-sanctioned killing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Among the truisms imparted by Tocqueville was that "there is 
hardly a political question in the U.S. which does not sooner or later 
turn into a judicial one."206 This is surely true with respect to capital 
punishment - but with a t�ist. In the early 1970s death penalty aboli­
tionists, borrowing from the successful judicial strategy of the civil 
kind to some of the monstrous crimes that are a too frequent feature of late-twentieth­
century civilization"). 
203. Beschle, supra note 170, at 487 ("For decades, the death penalty has been one of 
the most passionately debated topics in American law . . . .  Remarkably, though, when the 
principal arguments for and against the death penalty are examined closely, they seem in­
adequate to the task of either justifying the death penalty or proving convincingly that it 
must be abolished."). 
204. See p. 165 (asserting that "[o]utright abolition now has little support, and the aboli­
tion movement has become virtually invisible"). 
205. Sarat fails to address, for instance, how convicted killers should be punished, a 
question that has long hindered abolitionism. Abolitionism must resolve the question, for, as 
Herbert Haines has written, " [t]he credibility of the anti-death penalty movement hinges on 
its ability to provide a convincing answer." HAINES, supra note 17, at 135. "[C)oncrete sug­
gestions for alternatives to the death penalty" are needed, Haines observes, which "answer[] 
the challenge of homicide without mimicking it . . . .  The methods used will have to strike a 
responsive chord across the cultural and political spectrum of the country." Id. at 143. For 
one effort to identify an alternative, see David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative 
to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5, 122-32 (1998) (proposing that "highest condem­
nation offenders" be subject inter alia to a regime of intermittent "complete solitary con­
finement" for a mandatory period of forty years, and requiring that a picture of their vic­
tim(s) be posted at all times in their cells). 
206. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence, trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835). 
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rights campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, looked to the courts, and to 
the Supreme Court in particular, to outlaw the death penalty. The 
abolitionist hopes inspired by Furman in 1972, however, were dashed 
by Gregg in 1976, again making the death penalty in·essence a political 
question.207 This shift, in tum, ushered in twenty-five years of what 
Justice Blackmun later aptly called judicial "tinker[ing] with the ma­
chinery of death."208 The courts, ultimately, have not provided much 
re'lief as a result of such tinkering and, as the legislative surge triggered 
by Furman instructs, perhaps actually fed the taste for capital punish­
ment,209 providing support to those dubious of the capacity of litigation 
to achieve social change210 and otherwise educate the public about so­
cial concems.211 
While the last twenty-five years have been dark ones for anti-death 
penalty forces, the momentum of late appears to have shifted in their 
favor, as evidenced by recent decreases in public opinion support for 
capital punishment212 and in the number of death sentences imposed213 
and implemented.214 This shift, in tum, has been accompanied by a 
transformation in the terms and tactics of the debate. As recently 
207. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (noting that "[t]he most marked in­
dication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response 
to Furman"); id. (observing that "it is now evident that a large proportion of American soci­
ety continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanc­
tion"). 
208. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1 141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
209. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 23, at 65-69. Beside the federalism-based 
backlash, evidenced in the resurgence of state capital statutes after Furman, death penalty 
constitutional litigation itself - which serves to highlight unsavory defendants and their 
gruesome deeds - likely fed America's appetite. See supra note 58 and accompanying text 
(noting comparatively low percentages of public support in the pre-Furman era). 
210. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS (1999). For a contrary view see, for example, LEVERAGING THE LAW: 
USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A Schultz ed., 1998). Beyond 
basic institutional limits, judicial abolitionism has been impaired by the democratic sensitiv­
ity of state judges to the hot-button issue of the death penalty. See supra note 64. 
211. See JONATHON D. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT 145 (1972) 
(observing that 1960s civil rights lawyers used "the courts as a vehicle to impress upon their 
fellow citizens the illegitimacy and immorality of racial discrimination"). 
212. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
213. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2000, at 
13, App. tbl. 1 (Dec. 2001) (noting that 214 death sentences were imposed in 2000, 280 in 
1999, and 303 in 1998). 
214. See Death Row U.S.A., supra note 54 (noting that after a several-decade long high 
of 98 executions in 1999, there were 85 executions in 2000 and 66 in 2001); see also Tom 
Brune, Nation Examines Death Penalty: Amid Capital Punishment Concerns, Federal, State 
Executions Declining, NEWSDAY, June 10, 2001, at AS (noting that "the fast pace of state 
executions appears to have slowed as the nation takes stock of how capital punishment 
works"). 
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noted by Professor Louis Bilionis, "we have entered a period of public 
(rather than judicial) constitutional discourse. The constitutional de­
bate has moved from the courts to the streets."215 When the State Kills 
is emblematic of this 1shift, abjuring a "frontal assault" on the death 
penalty as a strictly constitutional and moral matter,216 instead seeking 
to convince Americans that what capital punishment does "to us" is 
not worth whatever it does "for us." In the end, it must be said that· 
When the State Kills does a masterful job of chronicling how the death 
penalty at once affects and mirrors the "American condition," as the 
book's title promises. Whether Sarat's optimism over the "new aboli­
tionism" is warranted,217 however, remains to be seen. 
215. Bilionis, supra note 27, at 605 (emphasis omitted). This shift has not been lost on 
death penalty proponents. See, e.g. , Byron York, The Death of Death, AM. SPECTATOR, 20, 
21-22 (2000) (noting efforts by abolitionists to "emphasize the word innocent" and accentu­
ate "news-making reports on the most controversial aspects of the death penalty"). 
216. Bilionis argues that it is wrong to view the Court's ongoing "deconstitutionaliza-
tion" of the death penalty as tantamount to mooting constitutionalism: 
This thinking implicitly grants judges a monopoly �n access to the Constitution, rendering 
the Constitution a text that speaks to us only through the filtering medium of judges and law. 
This robs the Constitution of its considerable potential as a source and basis of public debate 
about our most fundamental values and their observance. 
Bilionis, supra note 27, at 605. Like Sarat, Bilionis thus endorses a broad notion of constitu­
tionalism, which seeks to undo efforts since Furman to cast the deficiencies of the death 
penalty in judicial terms, to in effect re-translate issues into terms accessible to the public in 
the hope of striking a resonant chord. 
217. See, e.g., p. 254 (asserting that "[a]ll that is required to generate opposition to exe­
cution is a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and a mature engagement in re­
sponding to society's most severe social problems"). 
